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Abstract
This dissertation is comprised of two essays examining labor market outcomes of young
adults within the last two decades. The first is motivated by critics of the U.S. education system’s
current emphasis on 4-year college education who suggest the returns to a 2-year college degree,
especially within a career and technology education (CTE) field, could exceed those to a 4-year
degree. Evidence on this question has been lacking, in no small part due to the problem of accounting
for selection of youth into different schooling choices, which depends on their verbal, math, and
mechanical abilities (among other factors). I help fill this void by estimating a generalized Roy
model using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997, in which youth choose
among 5 college alternatives: no college, 2-year CTE, 2-year non-CTE, 4-year STEM (science,
technology, engineering and mathematics), and 4-year non-STEM programs. The results permit me
to construct consistent estimates of the expected cumulative earnings between the ages of 25 and 29
after each college choice for every individual in my sample. These counterfactual estimates reveal
that 14% of current 4-year non-STEM students would expect higher early career earnings had they
chosen the 2-year CTE path, yet the majority of these students would benefit even more from 4-year
STEM pursuits. On average the 9% of high school graduates that maximize expected earnings from
a 2-year CTE path, relative to all other college options, do not currently attend a four-year college.
This paper finds these students do not simply possess low verbal and math abilities, but that a high
mechanical ability is crucial in conferring a comparative advantage in earnings from 2-year CTE
programs.
This second essay within this dissertation estimates how narrowly-defined mismatches be-
tween employees and occupations affect young adult job mobility. I construct new measures of
academic skill mismatch, technical skill mismatch, and educational mismatch using employee level
data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) and occupation-level data from
ii
the Occupational Information Network (O*NET). Skill mismatch measures capture the distance be-
tween an individual’s tested abilities (in percentile terms) and the reported skill requirements of an
occupation (in similar percentile terms). Estimation of a Cox proportional hazards model of job
tenure reveals that a ten point increase in academic skill mismatch increases a worker’s monthly haz-
ard of leaving a job by 2.3%, yet technical skill mismatches have no effect. An employee is also 1.7%
more likely to leave a job in any given month if ten percent fewer employees within their occupation
possess the same level of education. The main benefit of my mismatch measures is their derivation
from underlying individual and occupational characteristics. I demonstrate that these characteris-
tics not only influence employee-occupation mismatch, but independently affect job turnover. Thus,
their inclusion significantly alters estimates of how employee-occupation mismatches impact young
adult job mobility.
iii
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Chapter 1
Are Four Years of College Two
Years Too Many? Returns to
Abilities Across College Programs
1.1 Introduction
Tuition at public US four-year colleges has risen by eighty-seven percent since 2001 and total
student loan debt now exceeds $1.2 trillion. While the four-year college wage premium remains high,
it plateaued in the late 1990’s (Carneiro and S. Lee, 2011; James, 2012) and returns increasingly
vary across fields of study (Altonji, Kahn, et al., 2014; Gemici and Wiswall, 2014). The US federal
government spends in excess of $4 billion annually to increase degree attainment within the most
remunerative disciplines of science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) (Rothwell,
2013), yet the majority of bachelor degree completions remain in non-STEM fields.1
The continued rise in college tuition, coupled with lesser returns to bachelor degrees in non-
STEM fields, motivate suggestions that many students may expect higher returns after two-year
college programs compared to four-year college programs. Policymakers advance this possibility
on several grounds. First, employers report difficulty in filling positions that require some college,
but less than a bachelor’s degree (Kochan et al., 2012; Cappelli, 2015). Second, annual returns to
vocational and technical two-year college programs have been estimated as high as 29% (Jacobson
1See Degree Attainment 2015.
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et al., 2005). Third, the costs of two-year college credentials are far less than those of traditional,
four-year college programs (Vedder et al., 2010). In sum, critics of current policy assert the $150
billion invested annually in higher education through government spending (Schroeder et al., 2015)
disproportionately encourages youth to spend four years pursuing relatively less lucrative, non-STEM
bachelor degrees when many could earn more after only two years of college.
Yet evidence of how many students, if any, can expect higher earnings after a two-year,
rather than a four-year, college program is lacking. This is in no small part because large differences
in student abilities across college programs complicate accurate estimations of counterfactual earn-
ings. Despite concerns that the higher average abilities of four-year college students will cause the
estimated earnings of four-year programs to be overstated for their relatively less able peers, research
suggests low-ability students still benefit from four-year college.Prior research has found students
induced to attend four-year college may have higher returns than the average college student (Card,
1993; Kane and Rouse, 1995; Lemieux and Card, 2001; Card, 2001; Stanley, 2003; Angrist and Chen,
2011). And recently Zimmerman (2014) exploits a GPA admission cut-off to show that academically
marginal students that gain admittance and attend a public four-year college earn 11% more per
college year than students who did not gain admittance. These findings are consistent with evidence
that Still, his results do not imply that every low ability student, or even a majority, would benefit
more from a four-, rather than a two-year college.
Estimating the expected returns of college programs for a given person is difficult as selec-
tion into programs on abilities is not necessarily hierarchical in nature, but a function of different
dimensions of ability. While regression discontinuities often control for a single ability measure, such
as GPA or SAT score, college choice can still be influenced by potential earnings that arise from
a particular ability dimension. Prada and Urzua (2014) use the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1979 (NLSY79) to show that, ceteris paribus, students with higher mechanical abilities are
less likely to attend a four-year college, and mechanical ability uniquely increases earnings among
those who do not attend a four-year college. As a result, they estimate 22% of the population can
expect higher wages between the ages of 25 and 30 if they do not attend a four-year college (Prada
and Urzua, 2014). Still, the binary choice examined by Prada and Urzua (attending four-year college
or not) hides which alternative postsecondary option may be the best alternative to four-year college
for different students.
Research focused on two-year alternatives has used before-and-after comparison of earnings
2
to establish that the returns to two-year career and technical education (CTE) studies exceed those
to more academically-oriented, non-CTE pursuits. Comparisons of earnings within the states of
Washington, California, Kentucky, Wisconsin, and Michigan estimate the annual returns to CTE
programs range from 8 to 20% (Jacobson et al., 2005; Stevens et al., 2015; Jepsen et al., 2014;
Matheny et al., 2015; Bahr et al., 2015) yet are near zero for non-CTE fields such as humanities and
service programs (Jepsen et al., 2014; Jacobson et al., 2005). As valuable as these studies of state-
level administrative earnings data linked to two-year college records are, data limitations prevent
researchers from fully addressing selection problems inherent in the college attendance decision. This
complication makes the expected earnings of four-year students had they attended a CTE program
difficult to predict.
This paper fills a void in the literature by investigating whether verbal, math and mechan-
ical abilities can lead to higher expected earnings after CTE programs compared to other college
options. The premise that mechanical ability will increase earnings after CTE programs to a larger
extent than other four-year alternatives seems intuitive. Majors within CTE programs include con-
struction, manufacturing, protective services, and engineering technologies; and some of the most
lucrative occupations after CTE programs are automotive repair workers, carpenters, fire fighters
and electricians. These jobs are more hands-on and technically intensive than the average job for
which a four-year student prepares. As a result, the instructional focus of CTE programs may
uniquely help students monetize their mechanical abilities.
The organization of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents data from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) used in my estimation. The NLSY97 has extensive
college records that allow me to track college decisions for all high school graduates. Further, the
administration of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) to respondents enrolled
in high school allows me to construct verbal, math and mechanical ability measures from test scores.
I show that average ability measures vary both across college levels and across different programs
within the same college level. An exploratory analysis of earnings and ability scores corresponds
with later findings from causal estimation. On average, four-year college attendees earn more after
schooling than CTE attendees, particularly if they major in a STEM field. Nonetheless, those with
low math and high mechanical scores who attended two-year CTE programs have higher earnings
than similar college attendees who chose to attend four-year non-STEM programs.
Section 3 presents the generalized Roy model I use to control for unobserved selection into
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college programs. This is essential as prior research demonstrates unobserved characteristics may
correlate with test scores (Hansen et al., 2004) and bias expected earnings (Willis and Rosen, 1979;
Heckman, 1979; Carneiro and S. Lee, 2004). High school graduates are split into mutually exclusive
groups of those who (1) never attended college, finished schooling at a two-year college in a (2)
non-CTE or (3) CTE field, or finished schooling at a four-year college in a (4) non-STEM or (5)
STEM field. A two-stage procedure developed by Bourguignon et al. (2007) is used in estimation
to control for selection bias into these postsecondary options. The first-stage models selection into
college programs with college access instruments. The second stage regresses monthly earnings on
individual characteristics prior to high school graduation that include ability measures, and control
functions for individuals that selected into one of five college options. The resulting parameters are
used to predict expected, counterfactual earnings after all five postsecondary options for my sample
of high school graduates. Expected lifetime returns are also computed.
Estimation results are presented in Section 4. Mechanical scores positively determine earn-
ings after a CTE program, but not after four-year college attendance. Point estimates suggest math
scores are a positive determinant of earnings across all college programs; though some of these pa-
rameters have a high variance. An analysis of expected earnings between ages 25 and 29 reveals
that around 14% of four-year non-STEM college attendees, and 5% of four-year STEM attendees,
have higher expected cumulative earnings after a CTE program compared to their chosen program.
Nine percent of all high school graduates have higher expected earnings following a CTE program
than all four other postsecondary options. These results remain consistent when lifetime returns
are considered. Section 5 presents the robustness of my estimates. In particular I include academic
outcomes in high school or college, as well as behavioral and non-cognitive measures. The inclu-
sion of these measures is supported by research that consistently shows non-cognitive abilities and
behaviors positively impact academic and labor market outcomes (Heckman, Stixrud, et al., 2006;
Coleman and DeLeire, 2003; Cobb-Clark, 2015).
Section 6 discusses the relevant contributions of my results. Counterfactual expected earn-
ings after CTE programs are higher for current four-year students than for those currently attending
a two-year college. Still, most four-year students benefit most from four-year studies. The high school
graduates expected to earn more after CTE than four-year programs are more likely to be male, and
more likely to never attend college. These individuals’ comparative advantage in earnings after CTE
is not solely driven by the low returns this group would otherwise experience at a four-year college,
4
but by the increased earnings after CTE due to their high mechanical abilities. While estimation
of an occupational choice model extends beyond the scope of this paper, my results suggest that
two-year colleges help sort high mechanical ability students into more technical occupations.
1.2 Earnings and Abilities by Final Schooling Level
My data are taken from the confidential, geo-coded National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
1997 (NLSY97). These surveys are conducted annually by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and
follow 8,984 youth who were between the ages of 12 and 16 in December 1996. Detailed information
is provided on respondents’ educational choices and outcomes, earnings, family background, and a
wide range of personal characteristics that include verbal, mathematical, and mechanical test scores.
My sample contains the schooling and earnings trajectories between the years 1997 and
2013 of 3,654 high school graduates who worked more than 20 hours a week for at least one month
after completing all schooling. The sample was restricted to youth with incomplete information,
GED recipients, individuals who enrolled in college after age 21, and those who ever joined the US
military.2
Figure 1.1 displays the percentage of high school graduates that finish schooling after five
separate college options. Around a quarter of high school graduates end schooling at a two-year
college and nearly half do so at a four-year college. Attendees evenly finish across CTE and non-
CTE fields within two-year colleges, yet 80% of four-year attendees finish after non-STEM studies.3
I classify two-year college attendees within CTE or non-CTE programs and four-year atten-
dees within STEM or non-STEM programs using college coursework and reported majors provided
in the NLSY97 referenced against classifications created by the National Center for Education Statis-
tics (NCES).4 One complication that arises is how to treat students who transfer between college
levels. I classify students who transfer down from four-year colleges as two-year students (and vice
versa). A second complication is how to handle four-year college graduates who pursue post-graduate
training. These students are included in my sample, but observations of earnings are retained only
for the months prior to these students’ enrollment in graduate school.
2Just 15% of the original sample enrolled in a two-year college, and 3% in a four-year college, after age 21.
3The NLSY97 coincides well with national completion rates computed from IPEDS for public two- and four-year
institutions. Nationally, between 1997 and 2013, half of all completions within two-year schools have within CTE
fields, and 22% of bachelor degrees were within STEM fields.
4Details are provided in Section A.
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1.2.1 Earnings
The monthly earnings of those who have finished all schooling and work more than 20 hours
a week are the main variable of interest within this paper. Figure 1.2 displays average earnings across
young adulthood by final schooling classifications. Two-year attendees earn more between the ages
of 22 and 30 than high school graduates who did not attend college. Among two-year attendees,
those who studied in CTE programs earn slightly more than their academic peers. Yet two-year
college attendees have substantially lower earnings than those who finished at four-year institutions
shortly after the age of 22. The average earnings of two-year attendees also grow less rapidly than
those of their four-year peers.
Table 1.1 displays average monthly earnings and other labor market outcomes at the age of
30 for different levels of final schooling. On average, a two-year CTE attendee earns around $350
more per month than a non-CTE peer and $550 more than a high school graduate who did not
attend college. At the same time, the average CTE attendee earns $500 less per month than a
non-STEM four-year attendee and $1,200 less than a four-year STEM attendee. Monthly earnings
are constructed from a measure of compensation (wage plus the hourly value of benefits) multiplied
by monthly hours worked. Variation in compensation across college programs appears to explain the
majority of the disparity in earnings, rather than differences in labor supply. Four-year attendees
have a slightly lower probability of unemployment at the age of 30 as well.5
Although four-year attendees have higher average earnings than two-year attendees, earn-
ings vary substantially among students who finish schooling at the same college program. Figure 1.3
displays kernel densities of monthly earnings for individuals at age 30 by their final schooling clas-
sification. Significant overlap exists across distributions, with an analysis of the underlying data
revealing that more than a third of CTE earners earn more than half of four-year attendees.6
1.2.2 Abilities
This paper uses eight test scores from the ASVAB (Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery) to develop verbal, math and mechanical ability measures for each individual. Test scores
relevant to each ability are averaged and assigned a percentile score from 0 to 99 that reflects a
5Future estimation will only consider employed earnings. However, this paper’s findings are robust when earnings
of the unemployed are replaced by zero.
6Approximately 40% of CTE attendees earn more than the median earnings of four-year STEM attendees whereas
the top quarter of CTE earners exceed the median earnings of four-year STEM attendees
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person’s abilities relative to the national population.7 Prada and Urzua (2014) demonstrate the
mechanical ability components of the ASVAB (mechanical comprehension, electronics information,
auto information and shop information) reflect a different underlying factor than the commonly
averaged verbal and math scores within the NLSY79 sample.8 Although verbal and math abilities
are highly correlated and commonly averaged, Sanders (2014) demonstrates a consistent negative
effect of verbal scores on earnings across multiple datasets and educational levels when controlling
for math ability.This paper views a ‘reading penalty’ is an important, systematic determinant of
earnings and treats verbal and math abilities as separate earnings determinants.
Figure 1.4 plots kernel densities of verbal, math, and mechanical ability measures for stu-
dents grouped by their final observed schooling level. All three ability measures of two-year attendees
are concentrated slightly below those of an average person (denoted by the 50th percentile). Verbal,
math and mechanical ability measures also lie between the lower measures of high school graduates
who do not attend college and the higher measures of four-year attendees. The top panel of Ta-
ble 1.2 reports average ability measures by final college programs. Within two-year colleges, CTE
attendees have an average mechanical ability four percentiles higher than non-CTE attendees. Yet
the largest differences in abilities across fields are evident within four-year college programs. STEM
attendees have math and mechanical ability scores that average ten percentiles higher than those of
their non-STEM peers.
1.2.3 Abilities and Earnings Trends
Figure 1.5 plots smoothed, locally weighted regressions of monthly earnings on mechanical
ability scores to explore how abilities correlate with earnings after different college programs. Each
graph compares the earnings of attendees who chose a CTE program to the earnings of individuals
who chose one of the four postsecondary alternatives. The leftmost graph within each panel plots
earnings for all attendees. The middle and right graphs restrict earnings to those who have a
math score above, and below, the 50th percentile to disentangle the effects of math and mechanical
abilities.
Regardless of mechanical ability, earnings for college attendees of all math abilities follow
7This same procedure is performed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in their development of the average ASVAB
score.
8Despite derivation from the same ASVAB components, the mechanical ability measure used by Prada and Urzua
differs from mine. Through the use of a factor framework coupled with simulated estimation, Prada and Urzua capture
a measure of ‘latent mechanical ability’ that they argue does not reflect schooling at the time of the test.
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the average trends in earnings across final schooling levels (CTE attendees earn less than four-year
attendees, but more than attendees in other four-year alternatives). Such trends remain among
attendees with above average math abilities (plotted in the center graphs). However, the story
changes when the sample is restricted to individuals who possess below average math ability scores.
The average earnings of individuals with low math abilities after a CTE program exceed earnings
after a four-year non-STEM program when mechanical abilities are above the 40th percentile. The
difference between earnings after a four-year STEM program and CTE program also diminishes
across all levels of mechanical ability. This descriptive analysis suggests that CTE programs may
lead to higher earnings than after four-year college programs for students with low math abilities
and high mechanical abilities.
1.3 Model
This paper uses percentile measures of average test components relative to similarly aged
(though not necessarily similarly schooled) students. The percentiles are interpreted as a relative
measure of ability endowed among students at the time of high school graduation. While substantial
differences in ability measures associated with differences in earnings are evident. Yet these corre-
lations may be driven by positive selection into college programs on unobservable characteristics
(Willis and Rosen, 1979; Heckman, 1979; Kenny et al., 1978; Carneiro and S. Lee, 2004; Carneiro,
Heckman, et al., 2010). Without due consideration, the estimated impact of test scores on earnings
may suffer from bias because test scores may capture factors that influence earnings after a college
program that are unrelated to a student’s relative abilities (i.e. local economic conditions or high
school tracking procedures on correlated, unobservable student characteristics).
A number of approaches to correct for selection bias in cases with selection into more than
two options exist (L. Lee, 1983; Dubin and McFadden, 1984; Dahl, 2002; Bourguignon et al., 2007).
This paper uses a model and estimation procedure developed by Bourguignon et al. (2007) that is
a variant of Dubin and McFadden’s work (1984).
I specify the earnings high school graduate i can expect in month t after college option j
(no college, 2-year non-CTE, 2-year CTE, 4-year non-STEM, or 4-year STEM) below.
lnEarningsitj = β0j + β1jXi + β2jAi + β3jTit + uitj ∀ j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (1.1)
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Expected earnings are conditional on demographic characteristics, Xi, and abilities, Ai, prior to high
school graduation, in addition to potential experience, Tit.
9 Parameters of earnings in (1.1) could
be estimated through five separate OLS regressions. Yet significant selection into college programs
could bias parameters. Thus, the two-stage procedure developed by Bourguignon et al. (2007)
relies on observed deviations in schooling choice to identify unobserved attributes that will impact
earnings.
Selection into final schooling levels is modeled as a static decision. The indirect utility of
college option j is expressed as Vij for each individual i.
Vij = α0j + α1jXi + α2jAi + α3jZi + ηij ∀ j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (1.2)
Static determinants of earnings (Xi and Ai) directly influence utility, whereas the expected level and
growth of earnings after program j (β0j and β3j in (1.1)) affect α0j . College access instruments, Zi,
affect the cost or utility of attending college, but not subsequent earnings from that college level.
Errors, ηij , are assumed to follow a type-1 extreme value distribution.
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Estimation of the first-stage model (1.2) provides individual residuals (ηi1, ηi2, ...., ηi5) that
can be numerically computed and normally transformed (η̂∗i1, η̂
∗
i2, ...., η̂
∗
i5). These terms constitute
the control function used within each earnings regression.
E[uitj |Vij > max
k 6=j
Vik] = δ1j η̂∗i1 + δ2j η̂
∗
i2 + · · ·+ δ5j η̂∗i5 (1.3)
This control function, inserted into (1.1) yields
lnEarningsitj = β0j +β1jXi+β2jAi+β3jTit+δ1j η̂∗i1 +δ2j η̂
∗
i2 + · · ·+δ5j η̂∗i5 +itj ∀ j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
(1.4)
The control function isolates the non-stochastic component of each earnings equation error, itj ,
9Ex-ante characteristics that vary by individual, but remain static will be the focus of estimation. This has long
been a practice since the seminal paper by Willis and Rosen (1979) that explored schooling decisions in a generalized
Roy framework. Variables such as the selectivity of college attended, family process decisions and relocation decisions
may themselves be a function of abilities. As Rosen and Willis (1979) state, “it is more in the spirit of the choice
framework of the model to allow these ‘current’ events to be captured indirectly via their correlations with included
variables in order to estimate expected or anticipated results.”
10A multinomial logit is used to estimate the first stage, yet relies on the independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA) assumption and the option-value of two-year schooling raises concern. I classify attendance on final (rather than
initial schooling) to help mitigate this fear. Nonetheless, Bouguignon et al. (2007) demonstrate that even when IIA
is violated their model still provides selection correction.
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and removes bias from parameters caused by selection provided η∗ij and itj are linearly related
(Bourguignon et al., 2007).11
A more structural relationship between unobserved deviations in college choice and later
earnings can be computed from correction function parameters in (1.3) to ease interpretation of
selection terms. Such a structural relationship is expressed below.
E[itj |ηi1 . . . ηi5] = σuj
∑
k=1...5
ρ∗kη
∗
k (1.5)
Correlation between itj and η
∗
k is measured by ρ
∗
k and σ
u
j represents the standard deviation of uitj .
Without loss of generality, if for option j = 1, ρ∗1 > 0, positive self-selection on unobservables exists.
In other words, high school graduates who are expected to earn more from option 1 for reasons I do
not observe are also more likely to choose option 1 for unobserved reasons. Similarly, if individuals
that are more likely to start at college option 2 for unobserved reasons have higher earnings after
college option 1 than would otherwise be explained by observables then ρ∗2 > 0 in the earnings
regressions of j = 1.
Expected earnings for each high school graduate within my sample are computed using
parameter estimates following least-squares regressions of equation (1.4).
E[Earningsitj |Xi, Ai, Tit = Age] = exp[β̂jWi + δ̂1j η̂∗i1 + · · ·+ δ̂5j η̂∗i5 + (σ̂j2/2)] ∀ j = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5
(1.6)
The vector βj = [β0j , β1j , β2j , β3j ] are postsecondary-specific parameter estimates and each individ-
ual retains ex-ante characteristics Wi = [Xi, Ai, Tit]. Individual deviations from first-stage college
choice computed from (1.2), η̂∗i1 . . . , η̂
∗
i5, are unique to each individual and held constant across post-
secondary options to control for unobserved heterogeneity. The standard deviation of the corrected
earnings regression error for level j is denoted σj . I next sum earnings between ages 25 and 29 using
estimates of expected earnings to capture cumulative earnings over a five-year period.
CumulativeEarningsij =
29∑
Age=25
E[Earningsitj |Ai, Xi, Tit = Age, η̂∗i1 . . . η̂∗i5]
(1.05)(Age−25)
∀ j (1.7)
An estimate of the ‘return’ to a college program is also created. This return is computed
11An inherent assumption of my estimation is that unobserved characteristics, captured by the control function,
impact earnings in a manner unaffected by time.
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as the ratio of the earnings an individual can expect at a postsecondary college option over the
expected earnings if he or she never attends college, minus one.
Returnitk =
E[Earningsik|Xi, Ai, Tit = Age]
E[Earningsi1|Xi, Ai, Tit = Age] − 1 ∀ k = 2, 3, 4, 5 (1.8)
Finally, I impute earnings from age 30 to 60 using historical data. This allows me to calculate
the present discounted value of lifetime returns to college, as expressed below. LifetimeEarningsij =
60∑
Age=25
E[Earningsitj |Ai,Xi,Tit=Age,η̂∗i1...η̂∗i5]
(1.05)(Age−25) − Costj ∀ j
1.3.1 Estimation Data and College Access Instruments
Individual characteristics used within first and second-stage regressions are displayed in
Table 1.2. In addition to ability measures, individual characteristics that capture gender, race,
ethnicity and parental characteristics are included as covariates.
Identification of the control function within this paper’s estimation is dependent on in-
struments of college access. College access measures are derived from Integrated Postsecondary
Education Data System (IPEDS) data and tied to an individual’s county of residence ten months
prior to their high school graduation. Instruments include the cost of the closest public two-year
college, the cost of the closest public four-year college, the relative travel distance to a four- rather
than a two-year college (four-year travel time over the combined two- plus four-year travel time),
the percentage of associate degrees from the closest two-year college awarded in CTE fields, and the
percentage of bachelor degrees at the closest four-year college awarded in STEM fields. To improve
these instruments, the log of parent income is interacted with the costs of the closest two- and
four-year colleges.
The last five rows of Table 1.2 summarize college access measures by final schooling level. On
average, those who finish after a two-year program faced lower two-year tuition and were relatively
closer to two- than four-year colleges. Students who pursue a CTE, or STEM, field within a college
level lived close to colleges that award a higher percentage of their degrees in CTE, or STEM,
fields respectively. Measures of employment within ten broad industries at the county level are
also included within both stages of this model. These controls are included to help ensure the
impact of college cost, college proximity, and degrees offered are measured independent of underlying
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differences in the local labor market.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 The Effect of College Access and Abilities on Final Schooling Level
Table 1.3 reports the change in the marginal probability that a high school graduate will
finish schooling at the postsecondary choice denoted by column, averaged across all high school
graduates.12 Point estimates of how college access impacts college choice are signed as expected.
A $1,000 increase in tuition at the closest two-year college causes the average high school graduate
to be 1.4% less likely to finish after a two-year non-CTE program. An increase in the cost of the
closest four-year college by $1,000 increases the probability of finishing school after a CTE program
by 1%. If 10% more two-year degrees are awarded in CTE fields at the closest two-year college,
a high school graduate is 0.77% less likely to finish schooling after a two-year non-CTE program.
Conditional on four-year college attendance, if 10% more bachelor degrees are awarded in STEM
fields, point estimates suggest that the likelihood of a high school graduate finishing within a STEM
field is 0.7% higher. On average, an increase in parent income increases the likelihood a high school
graduate will attend a four-year college. All estimates have large standard errors. Still, the strength
of all college access instruments are highly significant as revealed by a Wald test.
Ability measures significantly affect college choice as well. Ceteris paribus, higher math
scores make high school graduates more likely to finish school at a higher college level, and a
ten percentile higher math score increases the probability of four-year college attendance by 5.5%.
Higher verbal scores similarly lead to attendance at a higher college level, yet the opposite is true
for mechanical scores. Compared to math scores, verbal and mechanical ability measures have a
stronger impact on students’ program choice within a college level. Students with higher verbal
scores are less likely to study CTE or STEM fields, whereas students with higher mechanical scores
are more likely.
12Hausman and Small-Hsiao tests fail to reject the the IIA assumption of the multinomial logit model. Still, any
interpretation of these results regarding how students choose college should be performed cautiously. Again, they
serve to correct the second stage estimation of earnings.
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1.4.2 The Effect of Abilities on Earnings
Table 1.4 displays parameter estimates from selection-corrected regressions of log monthly
earnings after five, separate final observed schooling levels. Results demonstrate that the impact of
abilities on earnings after final college programs differ. A wage penalty for verbal ability is strongest
for earnings after a CTE program, and is significantly different than the (potentially positive) impact
verbal ability has on earnings after a STEM program. Math ability scores are a positive, economically
significant (though not always statistically significant) determinant of earnings, regardless of college
program. A ten percentile higher math score increases earnings for those who do not attend college
by around 6% and for four-year non-STEM students by 4%. As hypothesized, mechanical ability
significantly predicts earnings for students after CTE program attendance. Earnings are expected to
be 4.2% higher for a CTE student with a mechanical ability ten percentile points above an otherwise
identical CTE student. This effect is significantly different than the possibly negative impact that
mechanical ability has on earnings after four-year programs.
1.4.3 Unobserved Selection and Earnings
Ancillary measures displayed at the bottom of Table 1.4 measure how unobserved determi-
nants of college selection correlate with future earnings. Despite significant measures of correlation,
the overall adjustments provided by control functions lack significance for all four different college
programs (but not for those who do not attend college). Thus, these findings should be interpreted
as suggestive. Estimated parameters of ρ1 in columns 2 and 3 indicate that high school graduates
more likely to never enroll in college for reasons I do not observe have expected earnings after two-
year programs above what would otherwise be expected. Positive estimates of ρ5 in columns 1 and
3 indicate that high school graduates more likely to enroll in a four-year STEM program for unob-
served reasons have higher earnings than otherwise expected if they choose not to attend college or
to enroll in a CTE program.
Table 1.5 displays how controlling for unobserved selection into college programs changes
the parameter estimates of earnings determinants. Odd numbered columns present parameter esti-
mates of uncorrected earnings regressions and even numbered columns present those from selection
corrected regressions. The use of control functions mostly strengthen point estimates of abilities’
impact on earnings. This is most pronounced for the positive impact of math ability after two-year
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college programs, and for those who do not attend college.
1.4.4 Expected Earnings
The following is an exploration of how expected earnings across final schooling levels compare
for different groups of high school graduates. Expected earnings after all five college options are
computed using parameter estimates presented in Table 1.4 and are conditional on the ex-ante
characteristics of each high school graduate in my sample. These monthly earnings are predicted
between the ages of 25 and 29, and include the relevant yearly fixed effect. I repeat this procedure
in 500 Monte Carlo simulations to provide standard errors and subsequent confidence levels for
explorations of expected earnings after college programs.
1.4.4.1 Expected Earnings Across Chosen College Program Populations
Table 1.6 reports the average expected monthly earnings between ages 25 and 29 for high
school graduates grouped by the final college program they chose. Expected average earnings across
two-year college programs are similar for high school graduates that do not attend four-year college
(rows 1 to 3). However, mean expected earnings after a four-year STEM program are around $350
higher for two-year college attendees than for high school graduates who never attend college. Four-
year college attendees would, on average, experience positive returns after either two-year college
program. Yet, the average expected earnings of four-year students after a four-year college program
are substantially higher. Despite differences in average earnings by chosen college program, average
earnings increase for higher college levels and for more technical (CTE or STEM) studies for each
population in Table 1.6. This coincides with prior research that shows selection alone does not drive
the higher earnings observed across majors (Paglin and Rufolo, 1990; Altonji, Arcidiacono, et al.,
2015; Kinsler and Pavan, 2015).
Average earnings reported by final schooling populations hide substantial variation in the
expected earnings among different high school graduates. Figure 1.6 plots kernel densities of the
expected earnings after each college program for all high school graduates within my sample at the
age of 30. Overlaps of earnings, similar to those seen in the raw data, are still present. Technical
fields within both two- and four-year schools have a wider dispersion in expected earnings than less
technical fields. Figure 1.7 plots kernel densities of expected earnings after a CTE program for
students grouped by their chosen final schooling level. On average, four-year college attendees are
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expected to earn more than current two-year college attendees, had they attended a CTE program.
Still, substantial variation in expected earnings reflects the fact that heterogeneity in students that
chose the same college program persists.
1.4.4.2 Expected Earnings Across Individuals
An individual-level analysis of expected earnings across final schooling level is now under-
taken. Figure 1.8 plots kernel densities of expected earnings after the final schooling level a student
chose alongside counterfactual expected earnings after a CTE program. High school graduates that
never attended college or who enrolled in a non-CTE program are, on average, expected to have
higher earnings if they instead attended a CTE program, whereas four-year college attendees typi-
cally have lower.
The first column of Table 1.7 reports the number of students expected to earn more had
they finished schooling after a CTE program rather than the college program they actually chose
(denoted by row).13 The second column reports what percentage of individuals who chose the same
final schooling level this number constitutes. Consistent with prior literature, a CTE program is
expected to lead to higher earnings for the majority of students who do not attend college (89%)
and who attend a two-year non-CTE program (63%). Among four-year college students, around
14% that major in non-STEM fields, and only 5% in STEM fields, are expected to earn more within
a CTE program.
Column 3 of Table 1.7 reports the expected average monthly earnings after a CTE program
(over ages 25 to 29) minus the expected earnings after an individual’s chosen program, solely for
those expected to earn more after a CTE program. High school graduates that never attend college,
and non-CTE college attendees are expected to earn around $400 more a month had they attended
a CTE program instead (this equals a cumulative earnings of $24,000 between the ages of 25 to
29). Selected four-year college attendees are expected to earn around $250 more a month had
they attended a CTE program (a cumulative earnings of $15,000 between the ages of 25 to 29).
Column 4 reports the expected average monthly earnings after a CTE program minus the average
observed earnings, solely for those expected to earn more after a CTE program. These earnings
seem consistent with predicted differences for all high school graduates, except for four-year STEM
13To perform this analysis, I compare the expected earnings after the program each individual actually attended
to the expected earnings after a CTE program. If the expected earnings after a CTE program were higher, they are
included within Table 1.7
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college attendees.
The abilities and gender of students expected to earn more after a CTE program than the
program they chose are reported in the last columns of Table 1.7. Students expected to earn more
after CTE programs consistently have higher mechanical abilities than verbal and math. Across
chosen college programs it also apparent that the average abilities of students increase. Around
55% of students expected to earn more after CTE rather than never attending college or pursue a
non-CTEing program are male. In contrast, 83% of four-year college attendees expected to earn
more after a CTE program are male.
While a CTE program may lead to higher earnings compared to a high school graduate’s
chosen schooling level, another college option may yield even higher pecuniary benefits. Thus,
I classify each high school graduate in my sample by the college option in which they have the
highest expected earnings. Table 1.8 reports the number of high school graduates, and their average
characteristics, by the college program that yields that group of students their highest expected
earnings. The first two columns report the number of students expected to earn the most after a
given college option, and the second column reports what percentage of high school graduates in
my full sample this number constitutes.14 Around 9% of high school graduates are expected to
earn more between the ages of 25 and 29 after a CTE program than all other college options. These
students are expected to earn an average of $47,000 annually between the ages of 25 and 29, earnings
23% higher than if they had not attended college. These individuals have below average verbal and
math test scores, but mechanical ability scores in the 65th percentile and are nearly all male.15 The
majority of these students do not currently attend college, and only 20% of this sample attends a
four-year college.
1.4.4.3 Lifetime Returns
Inherent data limitations constrain the majority of my analysis to examining the expected
cumulative earnings prior to age 30. However, differential growth rates in earnings after college
programs later in life may alter the pecuniary benefits of these programs. Figure 1.10 displays average
lifetime earnings of workers after separate college programs. A subtle increase in the growth rate of
14No students in my sample are expected to earn the most if they do not attend college.
15To ensure that these results are not driven solely by grouping males and females together in estimation, this
paper’s estimation procedure has been replicated for each gender. Section D reports the results of this procedure for
males. Ultimately, the findings reported here are robust. Around 14% of males, but almost no females, are expected
to earn the most from a CTE program.
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workers after four-year non-STEM programs compared to other postsecondary options appears. I
therefore calculate expected lifetime returns for each individual within my sample. I impute earnings
after the age of 30 by predicting earnings trajectories using Current Population Survey (CPS) data.
Earnings up to age 60 are used in the computation of lifetime earnings and I subtract the average
costs of college programs seen within the NLSY97 data.16 Table 1.9 displays the average college
costs for students within my NLSY97 sample by the college program where they finished their college
education. As suggested by these college costs, I assume a $10,000 cost to two-year programs and
$30,000 cost to four-year programs in my lifetime return calculations.
Table 1.10 reports the number of individuals (and their characteristics) who are expected
to have higher lifetime returns to a CTE program rather than the college path they pursued. It is
analogous to Table 1.7 in its presentation. A vast majority of high school graduates who did not
attend college (94%) still have positive net returns to a technical program. Around 9% of non-STEM
students and 5% of STEM students would expect higher lifetime returns after CTE programs than
their chosen program. Again, these non-STEM students that can expect higher returns after a CTE
program have above average abilities and are much more likely to be males.
Table 1.11 displays the percentage of all high school graduates expected to have the high-
est lifetime returns after a given college program. Approximately 8% of high school graduates are
expected to experience the highest lifetime return after a CTE program. The percentage and char-
acteristics of high school graduates who would benefit most from CTE are similar to the group with
highest expected earnings between ages 25 to 30 from a CTE program. The similarity in results
suggests that higher growth rates for four-year college attendees are largely mitigated by the up-front
costs of four-year college attendance.
1.5 Robustness
I perform a number of robustness checks to test the consistency of ability scores’ effect on
earnings after different final observed schooling levels. In addition, where appropriate, I verify the
consistency of counterfactual earnings comparisons. Table 1.12 summarizes variables included in
additional regressions by final schooling level.
16Further details on my imputation method are available in Section B.
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1.5.1 Degree Attainment
Prior analysis within this paper did not control for associate’s or bachelor’s degrees within
college program, as their impact on earnings are likely endogenous (those that attain a degree likely
have the highest earnings from it). Nonetheless, I test the robustness of my results on this academic
outcome. To help mitigate how ability scores may impact heterogeneous returns to degrees, I interact
dummies of degree completion with verbal, math and mechanical ability scores.17
Table 1.13 reports the results of earnings regressions after college programs with the inclusion
of terminal degree dummies interacted with ability scores. The returns to a terminal degree do not
appear to substantively change the impact of ability scores on earnings after a CTE program. There
is suggestive evidence that mechanical ability increases in importance after an associate degree in
a non-CTE field, and is less important after a bachelor degree, but these parameter estimates have
high variances.
I replicate prior analysis by computing an order statistic that places students into the field
where they enjoy the maximum early career expected earnings, this time given an associate’s or
bachelor’s degree. Table 1.14 shows that similar students are still expected to earn more after CTE
programs, even after conditioning on terminal degrees. Around 7.5% of all high school graduates
are expected to earn the most after attaining a CTE associate’s degree (as opposed to a non-CTE
associate’s degree or bachelor’s degree). The characteristics of these students are similar to those
previously identified as benefiting most from CTE programs. They are, on average, males with low
verbal and math scores, yet high mechanical ability scores.
1.5.2 Non-cognitive Abilities, High School and College Outcomes
Non-cognitive abilities and behaviors positively impact academic and labor market outcomes
(Heckman, Stixrud, et al., 2006; Coleman and DeLeire, 2003; Cobb-Clark, 2015). I therefore include
mental health and positive expectations measures, in addition to behavioral indices for criminal
activity and substance abuse (alcohol, cigarettes, and illicit drugs) within selection-corrected esti-
mation of earnings after all college programs.18 For brevity, only results for post-CTE earnings are
17This strategy, with the inclusion of selection correction techniques, will not fully remove the endogeneity of
degrees. For degrees to truly capture an average treatment effect, the unobserved characteristics that determine final
college program must also capture the likelihood of degree completion. This is a stringent assumption that is likely
false. As such, results should be interpreted with caution.
18Mental health capture the frequency of positive feelings (happiness and feeling calm) and the absence negative
feelings (downhearted, unable to cheer up or nervous). A measure of positive expectations is derived from respondents’
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reported here.19 Columns 2, 3, and 4 of Table 1.15 show that the effects of different abilities on
post-CTE earnings are robust to the inclusion of these measures.
The ability measures used within this paper are derived from test scores obtained while
individuals are in high school. They consequently may reflect schooling prior to the date of the
test. To account for potential correlation with high school behaviors that may affect later earn-
ings, I control for measures of student coursework and high school success in earnings estimations.
Specifically, the number of academic or vocational credits, categorizations of the courses a student
took and students’ high school GPA are included as controls within selection-corrected estimations
of earnings. As seen in columns 5, 6 and 7 of Table 1.15, none of these measures eliminate the
positive effect of mechanical ability scores on earnings after CTE programs (nor the negative impact
of verbal scores).
In addition to a terminal degree, other academic outcomes may also be a partial function
of abilities.20 Nonetheless, Table 1.16 shows that the inclusion of a terminal associate degree, years
of two-year coursework, whether a student transferred from a four-year college, and fixed effects for
majors do not undermine the estimated impact of ability scores on earnings after a CTE program.
1.6 Discussion
1.6.1 Selection and Earnings After Final Schooling
Issues of selection motivated this paper’s estimation. I find mixed evidence that high school
graduates select on unobservable and observable determinants of earnings into college programs. The
inclusion of all control function terms within regressions of earnings after two-year college programs
lack significance, but specific terms are suggestive. I find that high school graduates more likely to
answers that relate to the probability they will be enrolled in school next year and the inverse probability of them
getting pregnant (or have gotten someone pregnant) or seriously drunk next year. As a point of computation, both
measures were standardized for the respondents age at administration and converted to a percentile score from 0 to
99. Both measures are derived from respondents in 2000, when roughly 40% had already graduated high school. Thus,
responses are not interpreted as causal in analysis.
19Similar robustness tests were performed on estimations of earnings after all five college options. The impact of
abilities on earnings after other college programs were also robust. The results are reported in Section E.
20A common ex-post comparison contrasts students who dropped out of a four-year college with those who achieved
a two-year degree. Research has shown that four-year college dropouts have characteristics more similar to two-year
completers than to four-year completers (Velez, 2014). Within my sample, those who complete a two-year CTE
associate degree have significantly lower cognitive abilities than those who initially attend and drop out of four-
year non-STEM program. The associate degree holders earn around $50 more per month at age 30. Nonetheless,
unobserved selection into each group can bias any causal inference based on ex-post outcomes. Therefore, academic
outcomes based on initial college levels and programs can help paint a more complete picture of the explanations for
varied returns within college level.
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attend four-year college for reasons I do not observe are expected to earn more after two-year college.
One plausible explanation for this finding is that societal expectations are pushing productive workers
into four-year college. If students are driven into four-year college based on unobservable attributes
that correlate with productivity, the returns to two-year college will be understated for the general
population. The suggestive nature of this evidence warrants future research.
The estimated effects of math ability on earnings also suggest individuals who would earn the
most, regardless of college program, are less likely to finish school after a two-year college program
in a manner that may bias average expected earnings. I find that higher math abilities strongly
increase the probability that students finish schooling at a higher college level. At the same time,
when I control for selection into final schooling level, parameter estimates show math ability has a
significantly stronger positive effect on earnings for high school graduates who do not attend college
and a suggestively stronger effect for two-year students than in uncorrected regressions. Because a
high school graduate’s math abilities largely determines his or her college attendance, those with high
math abilities who remain in two-year colleges may have unobserved characteristics that negatively
affect future earnings. This would explain a downwards bias in the impact of math ability on earnings
after two-year college in uncorrected regressions.
When viewed together, all observed and unobserved characteristics do indicate the presence
of positive sorting on earnings into four-year college, particularly into STEM fields. A reexamination
of Table 1.6 demonstrates that the average expected earnings following two-year college programs
are relatively similar when averaged across populations defined by chosen college programs. Yet,
college attendees who currently choose a four-year program have much higher expected earnings after
a four-year program, most notably after STEM fields, than students who did not attend four-year
college. This finding does not change the expected returns of two-year college attendees, but does
suggest that their returns from four-year college programs will be lower than for current four-year
college attendees.
1.6.2 High School Graduates and Relative Returns to CTE
Tables 1.7 and 1.10 reveal the importance of considering multiple dimensions of abilities
on earnings. The two-thirds of high school graduates expected to earn the most after a four-year
STEM program are students who have above average verbal, math and mechanical scores. On the
other hand, those with the highest expected pecuniary benefit from a non-STEM program are those
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with below average verbal, math and mechanical ability scores. This highlights that low ability
students do not simply benefit more from CTE. Instead, students must possess high mechanical
abilities to experience a comparative advantage in earnings after a CTE program. Yet, regardless
of high mechanical abilities, high math and verbal scores confer most students with higher expected
earnings from a four-year STEM program. As a result, students who can expect the comparatively
highest return after a CTE program are a select group with low verbal and math abilities coupled
with high mechanical ability measures.
Expected earnings and returns tell another compelling story regarding the benefits of CTE
programs. Those with the highest expected earnings after a CTE field can expect to earn around
$47,000 annually between the ages of 25 and 29. This is despite verbal and math scores in the
bottom third of the nation. These earnings far surpass the highest earnings expected for those that
benefit most from a four-year non-STEM program. Still, the expected return to earnings after a
CTE program is much lower (0.23) than after a four-year non-STEM program (0.34). This illustrates
that the students who benefit most from CTE have expected returns to four-year college that are
below average. The most intuitive explanation, supported by this research, is that the opportunity
cost of attending college is higher for students with higher mechanical ability scores. Ceteris paribus,
students with high mechanical ability test scores are expected to earn more if they do not attend
college (see Table 1.4). This limits the returns relative to not attending college of mechanically-able
students for all college options. In fact, the average female return to CTE programs is actually
higher than that of males within my data. This finding is consistent with prior literature (Jacobson
et al., 2005; Jepsen et al., 2014). Thus, although males may experience below average returns to
CTE programs they do not necessarily benefit more from four-year college attendance.
The findings of this paper demonstrate that CTE programs can lead to higher expected
earnings than non-STEM four-year programs for some, but so too can four-year programs in STEM
fields. Around 14% of four-year non-STEM students are expected to benefit more from CTE than
their chosen non-STEM program. This group constitutes 5.6% of high school graduates in my
sample. Yet four-year students who benefit most from CTE programs, compared to all other options,
include only 1.8% of high school graduates. This demonstrates that while some four-year non-STEM
students would benefit more from a two-year CTE program, the majority of these students would
benefit even more from a four-year STEM program. While increased access to both CTE and STEM
programs may increase earnings of those who would otherwise major in a four-year non-STEM field,
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further research on the effect of changes in college access on college program attendance could provide
important pecuniary ramifications.21
1.6.3 A Mechanism for Abilities’ Effect on Earnings
While the positive impact of mechanical ability on earnings after CTE is robust to many
controls presented in section 5, its mechanism is unclear. A model of occupational choice is beyond
the scope of this paper, but descriptive evidence suggests different colleges train students for occupa-
tions that value different skills. Table 1.17 lists the occupation titles, monthly earnings, test scores
and degree attainment of the highest paid occupations of workers at age 30 after CTE, non-STEM
and STEM programs. For the top CTE earners, occupations include fire fighters, dental hygienists,
surveying and mapping technicians, and heating, air conditioning, and refrigeration mechanics. In
contrast, top earners after non-STEM programs fill a variety of occupations, whereas workers after
STEM studies are mostly engineers or managers. Mechanical ability is arguably most useful in jobs
held by post-CTE workers, whereas math appears more important for engineers, managers, and
financial occupations - jobs attained after four-year college.
I use the O*NET database to compute a percentile ranking of the importance of math and
technical skills within occupations as reported by workers. Figure 1.11 presents the relationship
between math test scores and the importance of math skills within occupations. Within the figure,
smoothed locally weighted regressions of required math skills within occupations on math ability
are shown separately by college program attendance. Those with a high math ability who attend
a four year college program appear to more strongly sort into occupations where math skills are
important. Figure 1.12 displays a similar graph for the relationship between mechanical ability test
scores and the importance of technical skills within an occupation. Students with high mechanical
abilities who attend two-, as opposed to four-, year colleges are more likely to enter occupations that
require technical skills. Such results are not definitive, but support the hypothesis that different
college programs guide students towards occupations that value and reward different abilities.
21While this paper lacks the breadth to investigate policies or their efficacy, programs to increase STEM enrollment
are relatively prevalent in the U.S. In 2013 the federal government invested over $3 billion dollars in 209 programs to
increase knowledge and attainment of STEM degrees.(Science, Technolgy, Engineering, and Mathematics Education:
Strategic Planning Needed to Better Manage Overlapping Programs Across Multiple Agencies 2012)
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1.7 Conclusion
The predominance of non-STEM completions at four-year colleges amidst a reported lack
of workers with sub-baccalaureate training motivated the underlying question of this paper: Can
technical education at a lower college level lead to higher earnings? A generalized Roy model
framework was used to estimate expected earnings after five college options as partial functions of
verbal, math, and mechanical test scores for high school graduates within the NLSY97. A comparison
of these earnings across groups, and individuals, revealed that CTE programscan lead to higher
earnings than four-year college programs for a select group of students. A majority of high school
graduates who do not attend college, or who pursue a two-year non-CTE program are expected
to earn more had they enrolled in career and technical education. Yet, among four-year college
students, approximately 14% of non-STEM students and 5% of STEM students could expect higher
earnings between the ages of 25 and 29 after a CTE program than the program they chose to attend.
Among all high school graduates, 9% are expected to have higher earnings following a CTE program
compared to other college options.
The students expected to benefit more from CTE programs than other postsecondary op-
tions are an important population. These high school graduates are predominantly male and have
low verbal and math scores, but high mechanical ability measures. Their low verbal and math abil-
ities limit their expected four-year returns and make them unlikely to enroll in any college. Yet,
relatively high expected earnings after CTE programs reflect positive gains that stem from their
above average mechanical abilities. As opposed to students who have low abilities across the board,
these students can earn their highest return from two-year terminal studies, and are expected to earn
around $47,000 annually early in their careers. Such an earnings advantage after CTE programs
does not appear driven by academic college outcomes, but the fact that different college programs
train students for different occupations.
The policy implications of this paper’s findings are increasingly important as calls to increase
access to two-year colleges gain traction at both state and federal levels of government. CTE
programs can offer substantial returns to students that would otherwise not attend a four-year college
and to many who would enroll in four-year non-STEM programs. However, low ability students
are not inherently expected to earn more after CTE programs than a four-year college program
(particularly if they intend to study a STEM field). Thus, efforts to enroll high school graduates
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that would otherwise not attend college, rather than divert students with technical aspirations from
four-year studies appear most prudent. In addition, efforts to inform students of their relative
abilities and attempts to remove any societal stigma surrounding two-year education programs may
help certain students realize their comparative advantage in earnings after two-year CTE programs.
This paper’s findings inspire promising ideas for future research. Tracking procedures in
high school influence future labor market outcomes (Meer, 2007) and where students attend college.
The impact of tracking in high school on college choice and later outcomes could prove interesting.
Further investigation may also focus on whether students will respond to lowered two-year college
costs by enrolling in non-CTE or CTE fields. This paper suggests that some individuals that would
otherwise major in four-year non-STEM fields could benefit more from CTE programs, though this
is not the case for non-CTE programs. As a result, estimation of the substitution between fields of
study at different college levels may yield important insights.
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Figure 1.1: Postsecondary Paths for High School Graduates
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Four Year
49%
Non-STEM
39%
80%
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%
The above figure denotes the final college attendance of my NLSY97 sample. Bold, black percentages represent total percentage of high school
graduates within the sample. Gray percentages represent percentages conditional on final attendance at the prior college level. CTE and STEM
fields are assigned through a process described in in Appendix A.1.
Figure 1.2: Earnings Over Young Adulthood after College Programs
Earnings within my NLSY97 sample are split by final college program attendance and plotted over age in the left graph. These earnings are
normalized to one at age 22 and growth relative to this benchmark are plotted in the right graph. Individuals may enter or exit the labor force
during this time.
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Figure 1.3: Distributions of Earnings at Age 30 after College Programs
Kernel densities display monthly earnings at the age of 30 for individuals split by mutually exclusive groups of final college program for my
NLSY97 sample.
Figure 1.4: Student Abilities by Final College Level
Kernel densities are plotted above for three measures of abilities derived from the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). Densities
are split by those who never attended college, those who finished at a two-year college and those who finished at a four-year college for my NLSY97
sample.
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Figure 1.5: Earnings After Final College Program Across Math and Mechanical Abilities
(a) Two-Year CTE vs. No College
(b) Two-Year CTE vs. Two-Year Non-CTE
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(c) Two-Year CTE vs. Four-Year Non-STEM
(d) Two-Year CTE vs. Four-Year STEM
Smoothed locally weighted regressions of average monthly earnings at age 30 on mechanical ability are plotted. These earnings are plotted within mutually exclusive groups of final college program
attendance. The leftmost graphs show the earnings for all attendees. The middle graph restricts the sample to those with math ability scores above the 50th percentile, whereas the right graph restricts
the sample to those with math abilities below the 50th percentile. Verbal ability is not constrained within these graphs.
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Figure 1.6: Expected Earnings After College Programs for All High School Graduates
Kernel densities of expected earnings are calculated from selection corrected regressions on earnings presented in Table 1.4.
The densities plot expected earnings for all high school graduates in my sample after each college program.
Figure 1.7: Expected Earnings After CTE by Current College Attendance
Kernel densities of expected earnings are calculated from corrected regressions of earnings after CTE programs presented
in the third column of Table 1.4. Densities are split by the actual attendance of high school graduates into five mutually
exclusive groups. Expected earnings after CTE are then plotted for these separate groups at age 30.
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Figure 1.8: Expected Earnings Of Actual Program vs. Counteractual CTE Earnings
Kernel densities of expected earnings are calculated from corrected regressions of earnings presented in Table 1.4. Each graph
contains the expected earnings for a different population. For example, the top right graph is restricted to two-year non-CTE
students. The expected earnings at age 30 after a non-CTE program and after a CTE program for this group is plotted.
30
Figure 1.9: Expected Growth of Monthly Earnings Across College Options
The above earning trajectories and growth rates are calculated from the corrected regressions on earnings in Table 1.4.
Earnings are normalized to 1 at Age 22 and the average predicted change over years is plotted across age in the right column.
These graphs plot the expected earnings of all high school graduates in my sample after each college option.
Figure 1.10: Expected Monthly Earnings Over Lifetime by Final College Program
Average expected earnings are plotted for the 3,654 high school graduates within my NLSY97 sample. The earnings of each
high school graduate is included for each lifetime earnings trajectory - with expected earnings after age 30 imputed from
CPS data.
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Figure 1.11: Math Skill Rank of Occupation by Math Ability Scores
The above figure plots locally weighted regressions of an occupation’s percentile rank of math skill importance on workers’
math ability scores after completion of different college programs. The importance of math skills given in the O*NET
database is combined with CPS employment data to develop a percentile ranking of the math skill requirements of each
occupation. Math ability scores are attached to individuals from the NLSY97 which constitute the sample.
Figure 1.12: Technical Skill Rank of Occupation by Mechanical Ability Scores
The above figure plots locally weighted regressions of an occupation’s percentile rank of technical skill importance on workers’
mechanical ability scores after completion of different college programs. The importance of technical skills given in the O*NET
database is combined with CPS employment data to develop a percentile ranking of the technical skill requirements of each
occupation. Mechanical ability scores are attached to individuals from the NLSY97 which constitute the sample.
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Table 1.1: Age 30 Labor Market Outcomes by College Program
No Two Year Four Year
College Non-CTE CTE Non-STEM STEM Total
Monthly Earnings (2015 $) 2,764 2,949 3,316 3,848 4,516 3,448
(1,638) (1,581) (1,808) (2,052) (2,387) (1,984)
Hourly Pay (2015 $) 15.29 16.51 18.30 20.50 25.26 18.84
(7.67) (7.25) (8.37) (10.03) (12.15) (9.66)
Hourly Compensation (2015 $) 16.42 17.55 19.68 21.52 25.80 19.88
(7.65) (7.34) (8.76) (9.51) (11.33) (9.36)
Weekly Hours 37.74 37.68 38.38 40.27 39.91 38.99
(12.05) (9.51) (11.18) (10.39) (13.01) (11.16)
Unemployed in Year 0.12 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.09
(0.33) (0.28) (0.32) (0.25) (0.26) (0.29)
Observations 956 447 444 1,234 287 3,368
1 All means are computed within mutually exclusive college attendance groupings for my sample within NLSY97
data. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.2: Individual Characteristics by College Program
No Two Year Four Year
College Non-CTE CTE Non-STEM STEM Total
Cognitive Ability Percentile
Verbal Score 31.5 43.6 43.3 61.5 66.8 49.7
(24.4) (26.0) (25.4) (25.0) (24.9) (28.4)
Math Score 31.0 42.5 43.3 62.2 73.0 50.3
(23.5) (25.0) (24.6) (25.1) (22.9) (28.5)
Mechanical Score 38.1 41.0 45.0 52.7 63.9 47.6
(29.6) (28.0) (28.1) (26.3) (26.6) (28.8)
Demographics
Female 0.43 0.54 0.50 0.59 0.46 0.52
White 0.51 0.46 0.52 0.61 0.67 0.56
Black 0.26 0.23 0.24 0.20 0.15 0.22
Hispanic 0.21 0.27 0.20 0.14 0.12 0.18
Parent Characteristics
Log Parent Income (Thous.) 3.89 4.05 4.00 4.34 4.48 4.16
(0.82) (0.86) (0.85) (0.88) (0.75) (0.87)
Highest Parent Grade 12.26 13.02 13.02 14.66 15.16 13.67
(2.35) (2.83) (2.69) (2.88) (2.72) (2.92)
College Access Instruments
2-Year Cost (Thous.) 2.06 1.79 1.98 2.10 2.17 2.04
(1.33) (1.35) (1.29) (1.26) (1.27) (1.30)
4-Year Cost (Thous.) 3.73 3.50 3.74 3.63 3.61 3.65
(1.51) (1.38) (1.56) (1.47) (1.44) (1.48)
4Yr Distance / 2Yr+4Yr Distance 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.56 0.57
(0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17)
County % of 2Yr CTE Degrees 0.56 0.50 0.55 0.56 0.57 0.55
(0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23)
County % of 4Yr STEM Degrees 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.26
(0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17)
Observations 956 458 450 1,437 353 3,654
1 All means are computed within mutually exclusive college attendance groupings for my sample within NLSY97 data. Standard deviations
are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.3. College Program Choice Estimates
Two Year Four Year
No College Non-CTE CTE Non-STEM STEM
2-Year Cost (Thous.) 0.0093 −0.0114∗ −0.0072 0.0023 0.0069
(0.0069) (0.0061) (0.0063) (0.0099) (0.0064)
4-Year Cost (Thous.) 0.0054 −0.0000 0.0100∗∗ −0.0099 −0.0055
(0.0061) (0.0056) (0.0050) (0.0084) (0.0048)
4Yr Distance / 2Yr+4Yr Distance −0.0602 0.0618 0.0747 −0.0349 −0.0415
(0.0414) (0.0458) (0.0467) (0.0539) (0.0256)
County % of 2Yr CTE Degrees 0.0275 −0.0777∗∗∗ −0.0153 0.0461 0.0193
(0.0341) (0.0194) (0.0274) (0.0425) (0.0274)
County % of 4Yr STEM Degrees 0.0076 −0.0362 0.0226 −0.0370 0.0431
(0.0439) (0.0397) (0.0352) (0.0460) (0.0400)
Verbal Ability −0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0005 −0.0005 0.0036∗∗∗ −0.0006∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Math Ability −0.0040∗∗∗ −0.0009∗∗∗ −0.0006∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Mechanical Ability 0.0017∗∗∗ −0.0005 0.0006∗∗ −0.0026∗∗∗ 0.0007∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Female −0.0550∗∗∗ −0.0025 0.0025 0.0602∗∗∗ −0.0053
(0.0134) (0.0121) (0.0113) (0.0147) (0.0103)
Black −0.0974∗∗∗ −0.0069 −0.0035 0.0597∗∗ 0.0481∗∗∗
(0.0172) (0.0188) (0.0162) (0.0237) (0.0160)
Hispanic −0.0806∗∗∗ 0.0302 −0.0049 0.0327 0.0226
(0.0182) (0.0208) (0.0160) (0.0221) (0.0173)
Log Parent Income (Thous.) −0.0216∗∗ −0.0037 −0.0127∗ 0.0221∗ 0.0159∗
(0.0092) (0.0078) (0.0071) (0.0132) (0.0082)
Highest Parent Grade −0.0252∗∗∗ −0.0030 −0.0044∗∗ 0.0247∗∗∗ 0.0079∗∗∗
(0.0030) (0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0036) (0.0021)
Baseline Probability 0.262 0.125 0.123 0.393 0.097
College Access Instruments χ2(20) = 33.377 p-value=0.031
Income X College Costs χ2(8) = 3.849 p-value=0.870
All Instruments χ2(28) = 56.888 p-value=0.001
Pseudo R2 0.161
Individuals 3,654
1 The change in marginal probabilities are calculated for each individual after one multinomial logistic regression of final
schooling level and the average change among all individuals is reported.
2 Interactions of college cost and log parent income are included in estimation - these effects are reported within the average
marginal effect of costs and parent income. In addition, measures of employment across broad industries at an individual’s
high school county are included as additional controls.
3 Standard errors listed in parentheses are computed from a bootstrap procedure clustered by county of residence (the level
at which instruments vary).
4 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.4. Selection Corrected Regressions Estimates of Log Monthly Earnings
Two Year Four Year
No College Non-CTE CTE Non-STEM STEM
Verbal Ability −0.0023 −0.0014 −0.0051∗∗ −0.0008 0.0053
(0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0015) (0.0041)
Math Ability 0.0061∗∗∗ 0.0048 0.0058 0.0043∗∗ 0.0028
(0.0022) (0.0034) (0.0038) (0.0018) (0.0052)
Mechanical Ability 0.0022∗∗ 0.0011 0.0042∗∗ −0.0003 −0.0049
(0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0020) (0.0013) (0.0036)
Female −0.2451∗∗∗ −0.1802∗∗∗ −0.2208∗∗∗ −0.0564 −0.0670
(0.0385) (0.0647) (0.0610) (0.0355) (0.0858)
Black −0.0340 −0.0051 −0.1466 −0.0376 −0.2400∗
(0.0604) (0.0895) (0.0984) (0.0504) (0.1417)
Hispanic −0.0090 0.0389 −0.0695 −0.0128 0.0425
(0.0548) (0.0811) (0.0908) (0.0519) (0.1122)
Log Parent Income (Thous.) 0.1058∗∗∗ 0.0848∗∗ 0.0769∗∗ 0.0767∗∗∗ 0.1266∗∗
(0.0188) (0.0340) (0.0328) (0.0204) (0.0549)
Highest Parent Grade −0.0055 0.0010 0.0016 0.0046 0.0035
(0.0124) (0.0188) (0.0212) (0.0102) (0.0238)
Age in Months 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0058 0.0095∗ 0.0231∗∗∗ 0.0295∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0038) (0.0080)
Age2 / 1000 −0.0185∗∗∗ −0.0054 −0.0079 −0.0280∗∗∗ −0.0408∗∗∗
(0.0048) (0.0079) (0.0081) (0.0060) (0.0123)
Constant 4.8213∗∗∗ 7.0422∗∗∗ 4.9697∗∗∗ 3.0102∗∗∗ 3.9797∗∗
(0.4989) (1.0323) (1.2757) (0.7531) (2.0020)
Ancillary Measures
σ2 0.3415∗ 0.7627 0.9129 0.3602∗∗ 1.1323
(0.1902) (0.6024) (0.8064) (0.1804) (0.9292)
ρ1 0.0799 1.1686
∗ 1.0388∗ −0.4970 0.8767
(0.2151) (0.6476) (0.6067) (0.6347) (0.8592)
ρ2 −0.3332 −0.0223 −0.2295 −0.8954 −0.6635
(0.5148) (0.1933) (0.6313) (0.5864) (0.9203)
ρ3 0.2357 −0.1258 0.1781 0.9659 −0.4260
(0.6692) (0.7069) (0.1937) (0.6965) (0.9200)
ρ4 0.1945 1.0589
∗ 0.7116 0.0990 1.7142∗∗∗
(0.4930) (0.5545) (0.5020) (0.1908) (0.5959)
ρ5 2.0731
∗∗∗ 1.2765∗ 1.7345∗∗∗ −0.6014 −0.2998
(0.5823) (0.7264) (0.5581) (0.6287) (0.3203)
Location Controls X X X X X
Yearly FE X X X X X
Correction P-value 0.031 0.262 0.135 0.332 0.272
Observations 91,340 32,642 31,492 86,309 20,775
Individuals 956 458 450 1,437 353
R2 0.276 0.176 0.275 0.222 0.299
1 Parameter estimates of log earnings after mutually exclusive final schooling levels for respondents within the NLSY97 are
reported.
2 A bootstrap procedure clustered at the individual level provides standard errors listed in parentheses.
3 Correction terms are included in each regression, but not listed in the regression. Ancillary measures capture the effect of
these covariates.
4 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.5. Selection Corrected vs. Uncorrected Regressions Estimates
No College Two Year Non-CTE Two Year CTE Four Year Non-STEM Four Year STEM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Verbal Ability −0.0021∗∗∗ −0.0023 −0.0010 −0.0014 −0.0029∗∗∗ −0.0051∗∗ −0.0017∗∗ −0.0008 0.0007 0.0053
(0.0007) (0.0016) (0.0011) (0.0024) (0.0010) (0.0025) (0.0007) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0041)
Math Ability 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0061∗∗∗ 0.0024∗∗ 0.0048 0.0024∗∗ 0.0058 0.0039∗∗∗ 0.0043∗∗ 0.0052∗∗∗ 0.0028
(0.0006) (0.0022) (0.0011) (0.0034) (0.0010) (0.0038) (0.0006) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0052)
Mechanical Ability 0.0019∗∗∗ 0.0022∗∗ 0.0010 0.0011 0.0027∗∗∗ 0.0042∗∗ 0.0001 −0.0003 −0.0006 −0.0049
(0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0009) (0.0020) (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0036)
Female −0.2457∗∗∗ −0.2451∗∗∗ −0.1562∗∗∗ −0.1802∗∗∗ −0.2025∗∗∗ −0.2208∗∗∗ −0.0866∗∗∗ −0.0564 −0.1390∗∗∗ −0.0670
(0.0233) (0.0385) (0.0391) (0.0647) (0.0370) (0.0610) (0.0232) (0.0355) (0.0523) (0.0858)
Black −0.0778∗∗ −0.0340 −0.0270 −0.0051 −0.1969∗∗∗ −0.1466 −0.0486 −0.0376 −0.1626∗ −0.2400∗
(0.0304) (0.0604) (0.0507) (0.0895) (0.0537) (0.0984) (0.0324) (0.0504) (0.0878) (0.1417)
Hispanic −0.0129 −0.0090 0.0745 0.0389 −0.0300 −0.0695 0.0058 −0.0128 0.1168∗ 0.0425
(0.0320) (0.0548) (0.0465) (0.0811) (0.0530) (0.0908) (0.0370) (0.0519) (0.0707) (0.1122)
Log Parent Income (Thous.) 0.0980∗∗∗ 0.1058∗∗∗ 0.0710∗∗∗ 0.0848∗∗ 0.0587∗∗ 0.0769∗∗ 0.0808∗∗∗ 0.0767∗∗∗ 0.1374∗∗∗ 0.1266∗∗
(0.0143) (0.0188) (0.0245) (0.0340) (0.0257) (0.0328) (0.0153) (0.0204) (0.0375) (0.0549)
Highest Parent Grade −0.0146∗∗∗ −0.0055 −0.0063 0.0010 −0.0040 0.0016 0.0002 0.0046 −0.0058 0.0035
(0.0049) (0.0124) (0.0071) (0.0188) (0.0068) (0.0212) (0.0045) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0238)
Age in Months 0.0139∗∗∗ 0.0138∗∗∗ 0.0054 0.0058 0.0097∗∗ 0.0095∗ 0.0235∗∗∗ 0.0231∗∗∗ 0.0297∗∗∗ 0.0295∗∗∗
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0051) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0051) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0078) (0.0080)
Age2 / 1000 −0.0187∗∗∗ −0.0185∗∗∗ −0.0053 −0.0054 −0.0082 −0.0079 −0.0286∗∗∗ −0.0280∗∗∗ −0.0412∗∗∗ −0.0408∗∗∗
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0083) (0.0079) (0.0078) (0.0081) (0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0120) (0.0123)
Constant 5.0729∗∗∗ 4.8213∗∗∗ 6.6642∗∗∗ 7.0422∗∗∗ 4.8322∗∗∗ 4.9697∗∗∗ 3.2196∗∗∗ 3.0102∗∗∗ 2.3279∗ 3.9797∗∗
(0.4225) (0.4989) (0.8751) (1.0323) (0.7584) (1.2757) (0.5981) (0.7531) (1.2025) (2.0020)
Location Controls X X X X X X X X X X
Yearly FE X X X X X X X X X X
Selection Correction X X X X X
Observations 91,340 91,340 32,642 32,642 31,492 31,492 86,309 86,309 20,775 20,775
Individuals 956 956 458 458 450 450 1,437 1,437 353 353
R2 0.270 0.276 0.166 0.176 0.262 0.275 0.220 0.222 0.286 0.299
1 Parameter estimates of log earnings after mutually exclusive final schooling levels for respondents within the NLSY97 are reported. Even number columns report estimates from regressions with
control functions.
2 A bootstrap procedure clustered at the individual level provides standard errors listed in parentheses.
3 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.6. Counterfactual Expected Early Career Earnings by Observed College Program
Expected Earnings (in Thousands of $) from:
Two Year Four Year
No College Non-CTE CTE Non-STEM STEM
Chosen Program
No College 2,672 2,819 3,036 3,241 3,299
(38) (59) (64) (83) (202)
Two Year Non-CTE 2,690 2,889 3,056 3,369 3,716
(47) (57) (61) (53) (152)
Two Year CTE 2,690 2,877 3,048 3,316 3,629
(43) (60) (59) (50) (133)
Four Year Non-STEM 2,728 2,941 3,169 3,582 4,121
(75) (104) (105) (41) (115)
Four Year STEM 2,852 3,058 3,372 3,802 4,486
(94) (151) (151) (55) (109)
Total 2,716 2,906 3,125 3,455 3,830
(60) (85) (87) (56) (144)
1 Average monthly expected earnings between the ages 25 of 29 are displayed after five final schooling options for students
grouped by their actual attendance. Columns denote the college program for which earnings are predicted and rows
denote the actual, mutually exclusive college education choice of students.
2 Standard deviations of the average, expected earnings by group are derived from Monte Carlo simulations and listed in
parentheses.
Table 1.7. Populations with Higher Counterfactual CTE Earnings than Chosen Program
E[ ̂EarnCTE ]− E[ ̂EarnCTE ]− Ability Scores
Number Percent E[ ̂EarnChoice] EarnChoice Verbal Math Mechanical Female
Chosen Program
No College 848 89% $425 $586 32.3 32.1 40.1 0.43
[695] [73%] [$499] [$670] [32.5] [33.1] [42.1] [0.45]
(342) (36%) ($660) ($888) (33.3) (34.3) (46.7) (0.52)
Two Year Non-CTE 287 63% $398 $585 47.6 47.9 49.6 0.46
[189] [41%] [$540] [$807] [50.4] [50.1] [55.4] [0.40]
(47) (10%) ($825) ($1,008) (43.0) (47.5) (60.1) (0.28)
Four Year Non-STEM 208 14% $245 $426 60.4 62.8 67.3 0.17
[79] [5%] [$441] [$535] [62.2] [61.7] [73.5] [0.09]
(14) (1%) ($751) ($843) (55.0) (55.4) (81.5) (0.00)
Four Year STEM 18 5% $273 -$35 42.6 51.8 63.6 0.17
[5] [1%] [$490] [$1,318] [47.8] [57.8] [76.2] [0.00]
(0) (0%)
1 The first column reports the number of respondents who have higher expected earnings after a CTE program than the expected earnings after the postsecondary option they actually
chose (denoted by row). The second column shows the percent of students at that level the first column constitutes. The third column reports the difference of expected monthly
earnings after CTE minus the expected earnings after a respondent’s chosen program, conditional on this difference being positive. The fourth column reports the difference of
expected monthly earnings after CTE minus the observed earnings of a respondent, conditional on this difference being positive. Further statistics are the mean values for the the
students identified as having higher expected earnings after a CTE program than those expected from their chosen program.
2 Confidence intervals of higher expected earnings are derived from Monte Carlo simulations of expected earnings. Numbers without brackets or parentheses represent a 50% confidence
level; [] = 75% confidence level; ()=95% confidence level
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Table 1.8. Populations Grouped by Highest Expected Earnings
Counts: Expected Earnings Ability Test Scores Chosen College Level (%)
Number Percent Monthly Annual Return Verbal Math Mechanical Female No College Two Year Four Year
Non-CTE 17 0.47 2,954 35,454 0.18 30.3 31.4 43.0 0.06 41.2 23.5 35.3
[0] [0.00]
(0) (0.00)
CTE 326 8.92 3,881 46,567 0.23 34.3 35.8 65.4 0.06 52.5 27.9 19.6
[136] [3.72] [4,172] [50,065] [0.26] [29.4] [33.6] [72.6] [0.02] [63.2] [23.5] [13.2]
(30) (0.82) (4,638) (55,662) (0.36) (19.8) (26.9) (81.2) (0.00) (80.0) (16.7) (3.3)
Non-STEM 901 24.66 3,200 38,404 0.34 31.3 32.1 28.9 0.61 37.6 26.7 35.6
[430] [11.77] [3,143] [37,713] [0.38] [26.8] [28.2] [24.3] [0.68] [41.9] [25.8] [32.3]
(95) (2.60) (2,971) (35,649) (0.44) (16.6) (19.1) (15.5) (0.81) (44.2) (31.6) (24.2)
STEM 2,410 65.96 4,300 51,601 0.57 58.7 59.1 52.1 0.55 18.3 23.7 58.0
[1,803] [49.34] [4,520] [54,241] [0.63] [62.6] [63.2] [54.6] [0.55] [15.3] [23.0] [61.8]
(917) (25.10) (4,835) (58,018) (0.73) (70.2) (70.1) (60.8) (0.53) (12.4) (20.0) (67.6)
1 Rows denote which college option has the highest expected earnings for all high school graduates between ages 25 to 29 in my NLSY97 sample. The first column reports the number and percentage of all high school
graduates who have the highest expected earnings after the noted program. The last three columns report the percentage of respondents with the highest expected earnings denoted by row that actually attended the
college level denoted by column.
2 Confidence intervals of the point estimate are derived from Monte Carlo simulations of expected earnings. Numbers without brackets or parentheses represent a 50% confidence level; [] = 75% confidence level; ()=95%
confidence level
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Table 1.9: College Costs by College Program
Two Year Four Year
Non-CTE CTE Non-STEM STEM Total
College Costs for All Attendees
Family Payment 1,918 2,459 11,818 12,336 8,644
(3,988) (7,401) (17,987) (16,676) (15,543)
Total Loans 4,261 7,689 17,193 16,459 13,317
(17,832) (17,918) (42,399) (29,217) (34,705)
Out of Pocket 828 961 2,455 3,223 2,030
(1,524) (1,760) (4,149) (4,730) (3,703)
Total Payment 7,008 11,109 31,466 32,018 23,991
(18,661) (20,361) (46,513) (34,243) (39,342)
Observations 458 450 1,437 353 2,698
1 All means are computed within mutually exclusive college attendance groupings for my sample within NLSY97 data.
Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
Table 1.10. Populations with Higher Counterfactual CTE Lifetime Returns than Chosen Program
Ability Scores
Number Percent Verbal Math Mechanical Female
Chosen Program
No College 902 94 31.8 31.3 38.9 0.43
[795] [83] [31.7] [32.0] [40.0] [0.52]
(472) (49) (31.0) (32.3) (43.0) (0.45)
Two Year Non-CTE 334 73 45.8 45.9 46.6 0.45
[221] [48] [46.5] [47.1] [52.1] [0.38]
(53) (12) (44.0) (48.2) (63.4) (0.19)
Four Year Non-STEM 124 9 55.9 56.6 63.4 0.21
[39] [3] [49.6] [53.2] [63.9] [0.08]
(6) (0) (49.7) (50.0) (82.7) (0.00)
Four Year STEM 16 5 42.3 47.3 58.5 0.06
[3] [1] [32.7] [48.0] [56.3] [0.12]
(0) (0)
1 The first column reports the number of respondents who have higher expected lifetime returns after a CTE program than
the expected lifetime returns after the postsecondary option they actually chose (denoted by row). The second column
shows the percent of students at that level the first column constitutes. Further statistics are the mean values for the
the students identified as having higher expected lifetime returns after a CTE program than those expected from their
chosen program.
2 Confidence intervals of higher expected earnings are derived from Monte Carlo simulations of expected earnings. Numbers
without brackets or parentheses represent a 50% confidence level; [] = 75% confidence level; ()=95% confidence level
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Table 1.11. Populations Grouped by Highest Expected Lifetime Returns
Counts: PDV Ability Test Scores Chosen College Level (%)
Number Percent (in mil. $) Return Verbal Math Mechanical Female No College Two Year Four Year
Non-CTE 11 0.30 0.74 0.25 37.3 39.0 48.7 0.09 45.5 18.2 36.4
[0] [0.00]
(0) (0.00)
CTE 280 7.66 0.97 0.28 31.8 34.3 62.4 0.08 53.9 28.9 17.1
[97] [2.65] [1.06] [0.34] [27.1] [30.2] [70.0] [0.02] [60.8] [25.8] [13.4]
(13) (0.36) (1.23) (0.45) (17.1) (23.4) (80.8) (0.00) (69.2) (23.1) (7.7)
Non-STEM 907 24.82 0.81 0.38 30.9 31.6 30.8 0.52 38.8 27.0 34.2
[400] [10.95] [0.78] [0.41] [24.2] [25.5] [23.9] [0.56] [46.8] [24.5] [28.8]
(66) (1.81) (0.72) (0.47) (14.8) (16.9) (13.1) (0.73) (51.5) (25.8) (22.7)
STEM 2,464 67.43 1.08 0.65 58.7 59.1 52.0 0.57 18.3 23.7 58.0
[1,858] [50.85] [1.14] [0.72] [62.6] [63.1] [54.1] [0.59] [15.4] [22.9] [61.7]
(908) (24.85) (1.23) (0.84) (69.8) (70.8) (60.0) (0.57) (12.2) (17.7) (70.0)
1 Rows denote which college option has the highest expected lifetime returns for all high school graduates in my NLSY97 sample. The first column reports the number and percentage of
all high school graduates who have the highest expected lifetime returns after the noted program. The last three columns report the percentage of respondents with the highest expected
lifetime returns denoted by row that were observed to last attend the college level denoted by column.
2 Confidence intervals of the point estimate are derived from Monte Carlo simulations of expected earnings. Numbers without brackets or parentheses represent a 50% confidence level; []
= 75% confidence level; ()=95% confidence level
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Table 1.12: Additional Characteristics by College Program
No Two Year Four Year
College Non-CTE CTE Non-STEM STEM Total
College Outcomes
Terminal Degree 0.31 0.41 0.73 0.83 0.49
Year of 2Yr Coursework 0.90 1.02 0.29 0.25 0.39
(0.79) (0.83) (0.65) (0.59) (0.69)
Year of 4Yr Coursework 0.51 0.42 3.08 3.22 1.76
(1.00) (0.92) (1.45) (1.38) (1.83)
Transferred Into Program 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.09
Non-Cognitive & Behaviors
Criminal Index [0-8] 0.78 0.70 0.69 0.50 0.43 0.60
(1.02) (0.99) (0.87) (0.76) (0.72) (0.88)
Substance Index [0-3] 1.16 1.16 1.08 1.01 0.91 1.06
(0.91) (0.96) (0.89) (0.89) (0.85) (0.91)
Mental Health Percentile 46.3 42.0 49.0 43.2 46.1 44.8
(28.2) (28.2) (28.2) (26.3) (25.8) (27.2)
Pos. Exp. Percentile 48.8 55.3 57.3 58.1 57.0 55.4
(29.0) (29.8) (29.5) (28.0) (26.5) (28.7)
High School Measures
HS Academic Creds 1,421 1,677 1,664 1,973 2,063 1,784
(505) (454) (449) (457) (434) (523)
HS Vocational Creds 321 237 276 173 165 226
(268) (192) (220) (165) (157) (212)
HS Academic Concentrator 0.28 0.37 0.46 0.67 0.80 0.53
HS Academic Specialist 0.09 0.25 0.26 0.58 0.72 0.41
HS Vocational Concentrator 0.48 0.39 0.52 0.30 0.28 0.38
HS Vocational Specialist 0.24 0.14 0.22 0.11 0.11 0.15
HS GPA 2.60 2.79 2.81 3.17 3.35 2.97
(0.50) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.47) (0.55)
Observations 956 458 450 1,437 353 3,654
1 All means are computed within mutually exclusive college attendance groupings for my sample within NLSY97 data. Standard
deviations are reported in parentheses.
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Table 1.13. Selection Corrected Regression Estimates with Degree Attainment
Two Year Four Year
No College Non-CTE CTE Non-STEM STEM
Verbal Ability −0.0023 −0.0016 −0.0047∗ −0.0010 0.0057
(0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0027) (0.0018) (0.0046)
Math Ability 0.0061∗∗∗ 0.0035 0.0057 0.0037∗ 0.0002
(0.0022) (0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0020) (0.0062)
Mechanical Ability 0.0022∗∗ 0.0010 0.0042∗∗ 0.0014 −0.0012
(0.0010) (0.0017) (0.0021) (0.0015) (0.0045)
Terminal Degree 0.0274 0.1710∗ 0.2486∗∗∗ 0.2668
(0.0883) (0.0891) (0.0638) (0.1846)
Degree X Verbal −0.0015 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0027
(0.0032) (0.0022) (0.0015) (0.0038)
Degree X Math 0.0021 0.0004 0.0007 0.0047
(0.0027) (0.0021) (0.0013) (0.0045)
Degree X Mechanical 0.0014 −0.0005 −0.0021 −0.0025
(0.0025) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0036)
Location Controls X X X X X
Yearly FE X X X X X
Correction P-value 0.031 0.230 0.182 0.319 0.528
Observations 91,340 32,642 31,492 86,309 20,775
Individuals 956 458 450 1,437 353
R2 0.276 0.189 0.296 0.246 0.336
1 Parameter estimates of log earnings after mutually exclusive final schooling levels for respondents within
the NLSY97 are reported.
2 A bootstrap procedure clustered at the individual level provides standard errors listed in parentheses.
3 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 1.14. Populations Grouped by Highest Expected Earnings from Terminal Degrees
Counts: Expected Earnings Ability Test Scores Chosen College Program (%)
Number Percent Monthly Annual Return Verbal Math Mechanical Female No College Two Year Four Year
Non-CTE AA 6 0.16 3,793 45,511 0.28 55.7 54.8 80.7 0.00 50.0 50.0 0.0
CTE AA 277 7.58 4,520 54,238 0.35 35.0 35.5 67.8 0.08 52.3 26.0 21.7
Non-STEM BA 933 25.53 3,824 45,892 0.52 30.8 30.5 27.6 0.58 38.9 26.5 34.6
STEM BA 2,438 66.72 5,046 60,553 0.73 58.6 59.5 52.8 0.55 18.3 24.0 57.7
1 Rows denote which terminal college degree has the highest expected earnings for all high school graduates between ages 25 to 29 in my NLSY97 sample. The first column reports the number and
percentage of all high school graduates who have the highest expected earnings after the noted program. The last three columns report the percentage of respondents with the highest expected earnings
denoted by row that actually attended the college level denoted by column.
2 All numbers are reported with a 50% confidence level
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Table 1.15. Regressions of Post-CTE Monthly Earnings with Additional Individual Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Verbal Ability −0.0051∗∗ −0.0043∗∗∗ −0.0047∗∗∗ −0.0054∗∗∗ −0.0034∗∗ −0.0060∗∗∗ −0.0070∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0023)
Math Ability 0.0058∗ 0.0045∗∗ 0.0050∗∗ 0.0033 0.0058∗∗ 0.0052∗ 0.0025
(0.0034) (0.0019) (0.0023) (0.0031) (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0024)
Mechanical Ability 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0032∗∗ 0.0037∗∗ 0.0042∗∗ 0.0027∗∗ 0.0039∗∗ 0.0053∗∗∗
(0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0019)
Mental Health 0.0008 0.0010
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Pos. Expectations −0.0002 −0.0006
(0.0012) (0.0014)
Criminal Index 0.0248 0.0329
(0.0290) (0.0291)
Substance Abuse Index −0.0016 0.0061
(0.0273) (0.0317)
HS Academic Credits −0.0001∗
(0.0000)
HS Vocational Credits −0.0001
(0.0002)
HS Academic Concentrator −0.0407
(0.0790)
HS Academic Specialist −0.0531
(0.1082)
HS Vocational Concentrator −0.0262
(0.0683)
HS Vocational Specialist −0.0749
(0.0612)
HS GPA −0.1444
(0.1254)
Constant 4.9697∗∗∗ 6.2192∗∗∗ 6.1387∗∗∗ 6.2333∗∗∗ 4.9046∗∗∗ 6.7357∗∗∗ 6.8174∗∗∗
(1.1766) (0.9574) (1.0699) (1.1766) (0.8880) (1.1354) (1.1830)
Location Controls X X X X X X X
Yearly FE X X X X X X X
Selection Correction X X X X X X X
Observations 31,492 30,239 30,239 30,239 24,696 22,408 24,585
Individuals 450 429 429 429 343 307 340
R2 0.275 0.298 0.299 0.300 0.302 0.314 0.303
1 Parameter estimates of selection corrected log earnings after mutually exclusive final schooling levels for respondents within the
NLSY97 are reported.
2 Standard errors in parentheses are not adjusted for the two-stage procedure, and should be interpreted cautiously.
3 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 1.16. Corrected Regressions of Post-CTE Monthly Earnings with College Outcome
Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Verbal Ability −0.0051∗∗ −0.0043∗∗ −0.0045∗∗ −0.0042∗∗ −0.0032
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Math Ability 0.0058∗ 0.0061∗ 0.0062∗ 0.0060∗ 0.0062∗
(0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0035) (0.0034)
Mechanical Ability 0.0042∗∗∗ 0.0037∗∗ 0.0038∗∗ 0.0036∗∗ 0.0029∗
(0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0016)
Year of 2Yr Coursework 0.0042 0.0019 0.0136
(0.0314) (0.0313) (0.0327)
Associate Degree Holder 0.1387∗∗ 0.1368∗∗ 0.1319∗∗
(0.0575) (0.0575) (0.0587)
Transferred Into Program 0.0588
(0.0592)
Major FE X X
Location Controls X X X X X
Yearly FE X X X X X
Selection Correction X X X X X
Observations 31,492 31,492 31,492 31,492 31,492
Individuals 450 450 450 450 450
R2 0.275 0.298 0.299 0.311 0.333
1 Parameter estimates of selection corrected log earnings after mutually exclusive final schooling levels for respondents
within the NLSY97 are reported.
2 Standard errors in parentheses are not adjusted for the two-stage procedure, and should be interpreted cautiously.
3 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 1.17: Highest Paid Occupations After Different College Programs
Occupation Title Monthly Earnings Verbal Math Mechanical Degree
Two Year CTE Programs
Civil Engineers $11,350 78 25 94 1
Engineers, All Other $8,500 83 81 99 1
Fire Fighters $8,360 62 22 79 1
Dental Hygienists $7,700 48 64 62 1
Cement Masons, Concrete Finishers, and Terrazzo Workers $7,380 13 19 54 0
First-Line Supervisors/Managers of Mechanics, Installers, and Repairers $6,660 38 41 44 0
Tank Car, Truck, and Ship Loaders $6,610 13 37 35 0
Heating, Air Conditioning, and Refrigeration Mechanics and Installers $6,570 48 55 76 0
Surveying and Mapping Technicians $6,120 23 85 59 1
Respiratory Therapists $5,830 30 46 14 1
Total $7,508 43.6 47.5 61.6 0.60
Four Year Non-STEM Programs
Automotive Body and Related Repairers $10,940 37 60 50 0
Tax Preparers $10,740 58 68 58 1
Computer and Information Systems Managers $9,920 81 90 87 0.5
Public Relations Specialists $9,640 99 97 53 1
Industrial Production Managers $8,830 71 82 46 1
Private Detectives and Investigators $8,400 89 89 73 1
Operations Research Analysts $8,050 70 72 66 .7
Electrical and Electronics Engineers $7,670 67 71 92 1
Refuse and Recyclable Material Collectors $7,070 80 67 54 0
Hosts and Hostesses, Restaurant, Lounge, and Coffee Shop $6,930 78 82 20 1
Total $8,819 73 77.8 59.9 0.72
Four Year STEM Programs
Computer Hardware Engineers $9,880 94 99 78 1
Marketing and Sales Managers $9,490 77 83 72 0.5
Production, Planning, and Expediting Clerks $9,350 97 96 88 1
Engineers, All Other $8,650 77 89 88 1
Chief Executives $7,700 95 95 91 1
Mechanical Engineers $7,390 50 69 70 1
Insurance Underwriters $7,030 97 99 95 1
Chemists and Materials Scientists $6,810 70 80 97 1
Electrical and Electronics Engineers $6,780 44 85 90 1
Construction Managers $6,770 56 68 77 1
Total $7,985 75.7 86.3 84.6 0.95
1 This table lists the occupations with the highest paid monthly earnings at the age of 30 for attendees of the noted college program. The average earnings, test scores
and degree attainment of workers are alsoreported.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of Occupational
Mismatch on Young Adult Job
Mobility
2.1 Introduction
Job mobility is an important process that has large impacts on the satisfaction and earnings
of workers. Changing jobs is most common for adults early in their careers and is associated with
large labor market consequences. Topel and Ward (1992) demonstrate that young males in the
1960’s averaged six job changes over ten years and that these job changes accounted for at least
one-third of early career wage growth. Although job-to-job transitions of young workers has slowed
since 1997 (Bosler and Petrosky-Nadeau, 2016), the average worker who began their career after the
turn of the millennium still starts a new job nearly every two years.1 As in the past (Hall, 1982;
Murphy and Welch, 1992; Topel and Ward, 1992), these job-to-job changes have a significant impact
on workers’ earnings (Miranda, 2005; Yamaguchi, 2010).
This paper focuses on how mismatches between workers and occupations affect one mea-
sure of job mobility - job tenure. While many have studied how educational and skill mismatches
1This statistic is derived for high school graduates who are fully attached to the labor market prior to 2013 within
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97).
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affect measures of job mobility, including tenure, I do so using novel measures of this match. My
measure classifies the distance between an occupation’s skill or educational requirements and the
worker’s related ability measures or education level. I argue this measure provides significant benefit
to empirical investigations as it allows the researcher to control for both occupational and individual
characteristics in order to best isolate the effect of the mismatch between worker and occupation on
job mobility. I find that larger mismatches between academic skills and educational levels do cause
shorter job tenures. Further, I present brief evidence that the impact of employment mismatch on
job mobility is overstated, and potentially mis-attributed, when occupational and individual char-
acteristics are not explicitly controlled for (as is often true when measures of occupation mismatch
are derived from survey data).
The empirical work performed within this paper expands on current knowledge regarding the
impacts of job-employer mismatches. Topel and Ward (1992) provided some of the first empirical
evidence that the job mobility of young adults is consistent with matching models of on-the-job
search developed by Burdett (1978) and Jovanovic (1979).2 They show workers tend to stay longer
in jobs that are better matches for them. Neal (1999) demonstrates workers typically follow a two-
stage process where they first choose a type of career, and then find a suitable employer. In other
words, the earliest transitions between jobs for young adults more often reflect changes in career,
rather than within-career changes of employers.
Researchers often quantify the mismatch between workers and jobs using individual survey
responses. Workers are classified to be at the required education level, over-educated or under-
educated by comparing his or her actual education with the level required for their current position as
reported by the worker. Research demonstrates that workers who report being overeducated for jobs
experience higher job turnover (Topel, 1986; Hersch, 1991) and lower wages than similarly educated
peers (Duncan and Hoffman, 1981; Heijke et al., 2003; Cohn and Khan, 1995; Quintini, 2011).
Separate from the level of education, skill mismatches are also investigated with post-secondary
schooling major serving as a measure of workers’ skill. Self-reported responses of workers regarding
the major most suitable to their position and their actual major show that mismatches lead to higher
job turnover (Allen and Velden, 2001) and lower wages (Levels et al., 2014).3
While empirical investigations on self-reported mismatches between workers and employers
2These models of job search trace their inspiration back to Stigler (1962).
3Kinsler and Pavan (2015) also found students working outside their college major experience lower returns, yet
based their estimate of mismatch on crosswalks between majors and occupations.
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improve our understanding of career mobility, the measures may benefit from refinement. Miranda
(2005) demonstrates that workers employed in high-turnover firms experience more job turnover,
even after controlling for worker heterogeneity. If certain occupations experience high turnover rates
independent of employee characteristics, and these occupations also require low education or skill
levels, a bias is clear with survey measures. A worker employed in a low-skilled job is likely classified
as over-educated - but may be more likely to leave simply due to the underlying nature of work
itself. A similar story can be told for low-skill jobs.
In this paper I estimate the determinants of job turnover using a new quantitative measuring
of educational and skill mismatch. I accomplish this by combining occupational measures derived
from the Occupational Information Network (O*NET) to detailed individual-level data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97). This allows me to construct a continuous
measure of workers in the same occupation who have a higher education than the respondent, and
the percentage of who have a lower education. At the same time, the educational attainment and
the educational requirements of the job (as reported by other workers) are measured. Further, I can
calculate the distance between a person’s abilities (as measured by the Armed Services Vocational
Aptitude Battery Test) and the corresponding skill requirements of their occupation. Ultimately,
the richness of the data required for measures of job match allow me to control for both the role
an individual’s abilities and education play in job turnover, and the heterogeneity in job turnover
caused by occupational skill and educational requirements.
I estimate a Cox proportional hazard model of job tenure utilizing these new measures of job
match. I find that a ten point increase in the absolute distance between a worker’s academic abilities
and their occupation’s academic skill requirements (both measured in percentile terms) increases a
worker’s probability of leaving that job in a given month by 2.3%. Further, if the percentage of
employees who typically hold the same education level as a given worker drops by 10% within an
occupation, he or she is 1.7% more likely to leave that job in a given month. Controlling for the role
of occupations is important as jobs with higher academic, as well as technical, skill requirements
increase the likelihood that workers stay. Brief tests indicate that without these occupational (and
individual ability) controls, dummies indicating an over- or under- match of skill are higher in
magnitude, and at times mis-signed.
The organization of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 justifies my measures of
skill and educational mismatch between employees and occupations. It then presents a descriptive
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summary of the data and its trends. Section 3 discusses the Cox proportional hazards model used
in estimation. Section 4 presents the main results of my paper and a few robustness checks. Section
5 discusses these results, whereas the final section concludes.
2.2 Data
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) provides the individual-level
data on worker characteristics and employment history used in this paper’s analysis. The NLSY97
is a set of ongoing annual surveys that began in 1997 and whose respondents, at that time, were 12
to 16 years old. The data available today extends up until 2013 when every respondent is at least
30 years old. The NLSY97 is uniquely suited for an exploration of job mismatch and tenure as each
respondent’s employment history is available on a monthly basis. I am able to observe the length of
tenure at a given job and its subsequent occupational code, hourly compensation and the worker’s
reporting of job satisfaction. I use the Occupational Information Network (O*NET) to measure
the skill requirements and workers’ typical education levels required within an occupation and then
attach these measures to worker’s occupations in the NLSY97.
While the NLSY97 follows 8,984 respondents my investigation is restricted to 3,703 of these
individuals. Within the NLSY97 I restrict my sample only to high school graduates (leaving 6,591
of the original 8,8984 respondents remaining) with academic and mechanical ability measures (5,277
remaining) and who were fully attached to the labor market after completing any post-secondary
schooling (4,043 remaining). Three-hundred and forty individuals are lost as they did not possess
complete records. My final dataset consists of monthly-person observations for 3,703 individuals
attached to the labor market.
2.2.1 Developing Mismatch Measures
2.2.1.1 Skill Mismatches
A central question posed within this paper is how to measure the match between an indi-
vidual and an occupation using information from each. While a continuous measure of education
mismatch is relatively straightforward within this paper, the same is not true for skill mismatches. I
focus on two dimensions of skill in this paper. The first of these is academic skill - a combination of
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verbal and math proclivities. The second is mechanical - the ability to understand and apply how
machines and systems operate.
Measures of an individual’s abilities within the NLSY97 are derived from the Armed Services
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). This test consists of 12 components and was administered to
high school students prior to their graduation. I use measures of verbal and math ability to represent
academic ability, whereas mechanical comprehension, automotive, electronic and shop information
constitute mechanical ability. Histograms of the raw scores for academic and mechanical ability for
individuals within my sample are presented in Figure 2.1. These scores are derived from computer-
adaptive testing. Thus, while scores are not directly comparable to one another, a higher score
indicates better performance.
Measures of an occupation’s skill requirements are attained from O*NET. Analysts assign
the level of importance that different skills hold within occupations on a scale ranging from zero to
seven. I isolate verbal and math skill requirements to constitute academic skills, and use 11 technical
skill components as a corollary to mechanical skills.4 Histograms of the averaged skill requirements
by occupation are displayed in Figure 2.2.
The different scales and distributions of individual abilities and occupational skill require-
ments naturally leads to the question of how to best measure the match between these variables. I
draw inspiration from assignment theory, as pioneered by Sattinger (1993). Assignment theory sug-
gests that the person with the highest skill level should be matched to the job that has the highest
skill requirement. Similarly, the lowest skilled person should be matched to the occupation requiring
the least skill. Percentile measures are therefore seen as a natural manner to rank individuals and
workers within occupations.
The percentile measures I compute for abilities and skill requirements are both nationally
representative in nature. I assign two percentile measures of ability using nationally representative
sampling weights provided within the NLSY97. This follows a procedure developed by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics (BLS) that administers the NLSY97.5 For occupations, skill requirements are
converted into measures that capture the percentile of U.S. workers who work in an occupation
4Specific skills for the academic skill measure consists of mathematics (weighted double), reading comprehension
and writing. Technical skill components are equipment maintenance, equipment selection, installation, operation
and control, operation monitoring, operations analysis, programming, quality control analysis, repairing, technology
design, and troubleshooting. Admittedly, academic skill requirements have a much more direct connection to academic
abilities than technical skills to mechanical abilities. Refining measures of mechanical skill mismatch is an important
direction for future research.
5The specific procedure also accounts for the age at which a student took the ASVAB in high school.
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with at least as high a skill requirement. The specific methodology to do so was first proposed by
Acemoglu and Autor (2011), and requires the use of employment numbers within each occupation
as provided by the Current Population Survey (CPS).6
Despite the fact that my individual and occupational measures are expressed in nationally
representative percentile terms, the representative populations differ slightly. Ability percentile
measures are comparable to the entire U.S. population, however occupational skill requirements are
comparable to the working U.S. population. If the ability distribution of those attached to the labor
force significantly differs from the national population, comparative measures may suffer a systematic
bias. Figure 2.3 displays histograms of the academic and mechanical ability percentile measures for
workers within my sample. On average, these respondents who are attached to the labor market have
relatively uniform distributions of academic and mechanical abilities. This suggests the systematic
bias of mismatch measures due to differences in the working versus non-working populations is
limited.
I define two measures of skill mismatch given comparable national percentiles of individual
ability and occupational skill requirements. The first, academic distance, measures the absolute
value of the difference between an individual’s academic skill percentile and an occupation’s academic
skill requirement percentile. The second, mechanical distance, measures the absolute value of the
difference between the percentiles of an individual’s mechanical ability and an occupation’s technical
skill requirement.
2.2.1.2 Educational Mismatch
I use a continuous measure of educational mismatch that compares an individual’s highest
attained schooling level and educational requirements within occupations. Occupational measures
are taken from the Education, Training and Experience section of surveys available from O*NET.
Workers within different occupations are asked to report the required level of education for their
position. As substantial variation exists in the answers of workers within the same occupation, mea-
sures of the percentage of workers that report a required level of education across seven categories
are possible. Given these percentages, an educational mismatch is computed by summing the per-
centage of workers who reported an education level required for an occupation that differs from the
6The procedure sorts occupations by mean skill requirement level (for example from academic skills being the least
to most important). Each occupation is then weighted by its employment share in 2010 (as observed within the CPS)
and a percentile measure of the importance of a skill is assigned between 0 to 99.
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education attained by the working individual within my sample.
2.2.2 Descriptive Explorations
Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics at the monthly level of observation for my sample.
The ultimate sample has 226,338 monthly observations where individuals were engaged in full-
time work that spans 11,332 unique person-job observations. Observations occurred between year
1998 and 2014 where individuals were aged between 18 and 34. Measures of individual abilities,
occupational characteristics and job-match measures are discussed below.
2.2.2.1 Individual Abilities
Figure 2.4 displays the scatterplot of academic versus mechanical abilities for the individuals
within my sample. A clear correlation between the two measures is apparent as academic ability
and mechanical ability have a correlation coefficient 0.6816. Still the inclusion of both measures
is justified thanks to the work of Prada and Urzua (2014) who demonstrate the measures reflect
different underlying factors, and Heijke et al.’s (2003) findings that vocational competencies (unique
from academic competencies) positively influence the chance of being matched to an occupation.
2.2.2.2 Occupational Skill Requirements
Table 2.2 lists three of the most prominent occupations within separate academic, and tech-
nical skill requirement quintiles. Occupations such as dishwashers, and construction laborers have
some of the lowest academic skill requirements, whereas mechanical engineers and pharmacists have
some of the highest requirements. On the other hand, counselors require little technical skills, yet
carpenters and industrial production managers require a great deal. Figure 2.5 displays a scatterplot
for the academic and technical skill requirements of the 461 occupations classified. A slight negative
relationship between the two types of skill requirements is apparent with a correlation coefficient of
-0.2276. Figure 2.6 displays the title of selected occupations plotted along their dimensions of aca-
demic and technical skill requirements.7 The bivariate densities of skill requirements by occupation,
as well as by workers, is plotted in Figure 2.7. While there are many different occupations that
7A concern may arise that a positive correlation in individual abilities, but a negative correlation in occupational
skill requirements will inherently lead to bad occupational matches on some dimension of skill. While this is true, later
model estimation can determine the salience or impact of either mismatch, if any. In other words, a bad measure of
match should have no effect on job turnover and solely suggests a refinement to that measure if any true relationship
exists.
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have low academic skill and high technical skill requirements, workers are evenly distributed across
these occupations. Figure 2.8 displays the bivariate density of occupational skills seen for the 11,332
person-job observations within my sample. Despite some clustering there appears to be relatively
strong dispersion across academic and technical skill requirements for workers within my sample.
2.2.2.3 Occupational Matches
Figure 2.9 displays the histograms of all three measures for each person-occupation match
within my data. Both academic and mechanical distance are unsurprisingly right-skewed. The
distribution of education mismatches is more evenly distributed, however there is a notable rise in
workers labor in occupations where more than 90% of workers report an education level other than
what the individual possesses is required. Table 2.3 lists the correlation between all three measures.
I find no relation between academic distance and mechanical distance of jobs, and similar to Allen
and van der Velen (2001) there is only a weak correlation between skill mismatches (specifically
academic distance) and educational mismatch.
2.2.2.4 Job Tenure
The length of employment, measured in months, for a given employer is the main outcome
of interest within this paper.8 I restrict the jobs of interest within my sample to jobs that begin after
an individual has completed all schooling and is fully attached to the labor market. I follow Neal’s
(1999) definition of labor market attachment whereby a person is attached to the labor market
starting on the first month in which 9 of the subsequent 12 months the person was engaged in
full-time work.9 Basic statistics on job tenure are reported in Table 2.4.
The longitudinal nature of the NLSY97 allows me, at times, to observe multiple jobs for
individuals within my data. The number of unique jobs held by each person within my sample is
displayed in Figure 2.10. While many workers have held only one job over my period of observation,
the majority (73%) have held two or more jobs. Figure 2.11 combines the histogram of monthly job
tenures for all jobs with a smoothed survival rate of jobs. It is clear that jobs are most likely to end
closer to their start date.
8While my measures of job match are specifically tied to an occupation, 88% of those who leave an employer switch
occupations. As such, I use tenure at a given employer to capture occupational match and subsequent departures.
9More specifically, I define full-time work as 30 or more hours working for the same employer and exclude intern-
ships, self-employment or military work.
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2.2.2.5 Occupational Match and Job Tenure
Educational and skill mismatches appear correlated with job tenure within my sample. Fig-
ure 2.12 and Figure 2.13 present locally weighted regressions of the impact of person-job mismatches
on job tenure for each person-job match in the sample. At small distances, the academic and me-
chanical distance between persons and jobs appear to have a neutral impact on job tenure. However,
a negative relationship appears as these distances increase. As a person is matched to an occupation
that typically requires more education at levels other than that of the worker, the average job tenure
declines.
Raw correlations of job mismatch and tenure may hide substantial heterogeneity by person
that exist due to their level of abilities, education level, or other characteristics. Therefore, I have
calculated the change in the three mismatch measures as a worker transitions from one to job to
another. I similarly have calculated the difference in job tenures between the old and new job.
The relationship between the change in job mismatch and the change in job tenure are presented in
Figure 2.14 and Figure 2.15. Here, a clear negative correlation is seen for an academic mismatch and
educational mismatch. As the distance between a worker’s academic abilities and an occupations’
academic skill requirements decreases, their comparative job tenure appears higher. Nonetheless,
the distance between mechanical abilities and requirements does not have a negative relationship.
Evidence that workers sort into occupations where they are better matched would help
explain why mismatches lead to shorter tenures. However, I find little to no evidence that this
occurs. Table 2.5 reports the average change in mismatch measures as workers transition between
jobs early in their career. While, on average, the academic distance between workers diminishes by
0.5 and the educational mismatch measure decreases by 0.76, these effects are relatively small.10
2.3 Estimation Strategy
Despite the fact that mismatches of academic skill and education correlate with shorter job
tenure, a causal relationship is not clear. For example, higher measures of mismatch may be more
prominent for lower-skilled jobs, which themselves have higher turnover. As a result, I abstract from
job-to-job search models (Neal, 1999; Garibaldi and Moen, 2010) to estimate reduced form models
10When similar measures of skill or educational mismatch that do not take the absolute value of the distance between
abilities, skills, and education are examined a clearer pattern emerges. Workers typically move into occupations that
require higher academic skills, mechanical skills and educational level as they transition early in their careers.
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of job tenure.
I specify an underlying hazard rate λij(t) to denote the hazard of individual i leaving a job
j at month t. I parameterize the function as
λij(t|Xβ) = λ0(t)exp
[
agei(t)β1+femaleiβ2+femalei∗Ti(t)β3+Individualiβ4+Occjβ5+Mismatchijβ6
]
(2.1)
where agei(t) represents a quadratic function of the time-varying age of an individual in
months and Ti(t) denotes time-varying indicators for marriage, cohabitation and having one or more
children. Time-invariant individual characteristics are captured by the femalei dummy as well as
Individuali, a vector of race, ability measures and education level. The time-invariant measures
of the job’s occupation j are captured in Occj . The vector denotes an occupation’s academic and
mechanical skill requirement percentiles, as well as required education levels. Finally, the match
between individual i and occupation j are measured within Mismatchij . I argue the inclusion of
Mismatchij measures, while specifically controlling for the individual (Xi) and occupational (Occj)
measures used to create them allows me to isolate the true impact of person-job mismatch, β6.
I use the Cox partial likelihood method (Cox, 1972; Cox, 1975) to estimate the parameters
within equation (2.1). The Cox proportional hazard model provides significant advantages in this
estimation as the underlying distribution of the baseline hazard (denoted by λ0(t)) need not be
specified. This semi-parametric approach allows me to control for unobserved heterogeneity that
Heckman and Singer (1984) demonstrate can bias parameters within hazard models (Greene, 2012).
The effect of covariates are independent of the baseline hazards within this model, and as such
I will present the effects of covariates as an odds-ratio. They should be interpreted as having a
multiplicative effect on the likelihood of individual i leaving job j in any given month.
A special consideration arises in estimation due to my use of panel data in which I observe
multiple job matches for certain individuals. In my main specification I pool all spells and assume
full independence of these spells across individuals. While this may be a reasonable assumption,
prior investigations suggest that the frequency of job changes impact the underlying hazard of exiting
a new job (Topel and Ward, 1992; Farber, 1994). I therefore stratify the model by the job number
of an individual, allowing the baseline hazard of the first job to be separate from that of the second
job, third job, and so on. To remain cautious for the non-independence of spells across individuals,
I also cluster my standard errors on the individual level. To ensure my results are not driven by the
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assumption of independence across spells, however, I restrict my estimation at times to only include
an individual’s first job match in order to check the consistency of parameter estimates.
2.4 Results
Table 2.6 displays how individual, occupational and individual-occupational match variables
determine the probability that a given person leaves a job in a given month. Column 1 reports the
coefficients of parameters in equation (2.1) as hazard ratios. Mismatches between occupations and
persons in general do have a significant effect. Ceteris paribus, a person is 2.3% more likely to
leave a job that month if the academic distance between an individual’s abilities and a job’s skill
requirements increases by 10 points. On the other hand, mechanical distance has little impact on
job tenure. An individual is also 1.7% more likely to leave a job in a given month if their occupation
reports 10% more workers require a level of education different than the individual.
The estimated hazard ratios in Table 2.6 imply that an occupation’s characteristics may
have a stronger impact on job tenure than individual characteristics. Still, job tenure does differ
by educational attainment. Compared to an individual who never attended college, someone with a
Bachelor’s degree is 15% more likely to leave a job, yet a person with a Master’s degree is 16% less
likely. If an occupation is ranked as requiring ten percentile points more academic skill, a person is
3.5% less likely to leave in a given month. A ten percentile higher technical skill requirement within
an occupation decreases that same probability by 1.5%. Occupations that require more education
than a high school dropout possesses all lead to longer job tenures.
2.4.1 Sub-samples
Columns 2 to 6 in Table 2.6 report parameter coefficients from estimations performed on
different sub-samples of my data to test whether results hold between different groups. Column
2 tests whether restricting my sample to only include a person’s first job substantially changes
estimated hazard ratios. The results do appear consistent with analysis of pooled jobs by individual.
Although the coefficient on academic distance is not statistically significant within this limited
sample, it is not statistically different than the first estimation’s point estimate.
I split estimation by gender in Columns 3 to 4 to test whether my results are driven by
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pooling genders.11 The negative impact of academic distance on job tenure remains robust. Still,
educational mismatch appears to exert the strongest influence on males, rather than females.
I further split my sample into those who attained a bachelor degree or higher, and those
who did not. Columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.6 report the hazard ratios for these two subsamples.
Splitting the sample in such a way is a worthy investigation as Yamaguchi (2010) argues college
workers learn more regarding their skills and interests prior to their attachment to the labor force,
and therefore experience a lower rate of turnover. Still, the negative impact on job tenure remains
for both groups. Those who attained a bachelor degree or higher appear not to be effected by a
mismatch in educational levels, however.
2.4.2 Job Satisfaction and Compensation
Job satisfaction and compensation (hourly pay plus the hourly value of benefits) are un-
surprisingly important determinants of job tenure. To this point I have excluded them from my
analysis as they are likely a function of job match. I now include them in my model as covariates to
examine whether the impact of job mismatch is fully absorbed by these other explanatory variables.
Table 2.7 reports the results.
Job satisfaction has a very apparent impact on job tenure with more satisfied workers being
less likely to leave a job. The difference is so large that, all else equal, a most satisfied person (level=5)
is around 70% less likely to leave their job in a given month than if they were the least satisfied person
(with the omitted level equal to 1). An extra dollar in compensation also decreases the probability
a person will exit unemployment by around 5.5%. While the impact of academic distance on job
tenure remains robust to the inclusion of job satisfaction and compensation, educational mismatch
does not. It appears that educational mismatch causes both lower satisfaction, as well as lower
compensation, and thus increases the likelihood of leaving an employer through these channels.
2.4.3 Comparison with Prior Research
To demonstrate that my new measures of occupational mismatch improve upon current
standards I exclude some of my individual or occupational controls from estimations. Unfortunately,
11Splitting the estimation is motivated by findings that gender plays a large role in sorting males and females into
different occupations. Joy (2006) demonstrates that males often seek out more quantitatively oriented occupations,
which is consistent with my findings that educational mismatch appears to have a stronger impact on males leaving
their job.
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the NLSY97 does not include survey responses in order to assign dummies for skill and educational
mismatches. Therefore, I construct dummies from my continuous measures of whether a person is
over-skilled or under-skilled, over-educated or under-educated. I classify over-skilled as possessing
abilities ten percentile points higher than the skill requirement for a job, and under-skilled as ten
percentile points lower. For educational mismatch, I classify the one-third of matches with the
closest educational match (lowest percentage not at their education) as having the required amount
of education. Of workers remaining, I classify them as over-educated if a higher percentage of workers
report a higher education required compared to lesser education.
Table 2.8 reports the impact of these dummy variables provided different controls. Column
1 reports the effect of job matches without controlling for individual or occupational characteristics.
It is interesting that a classification of being under-skilled academically decreases the probability of
departing from a job in a given month by 5%, but the over-educated are 19% more likely to leave
a job in any month. Yet, as individual and occupational controls are added, parameter estimates
change. The effect of being under-skilled academically flips directions, and the impact of being over-
skilled academically reduces. Mechanical skill mismatches remain insignificant. With the addition
of individual and occupational controls under-education becomes a stronger predictor of leaving a
job, whereas being over-educated becomes a weaker predictor.
2.5 Discussion
My results provide robust and strong evidence that the match between an individual’s aca-
demic abilities and an occupation’s academic skill requirements play an important role in determining
how long a young adult remains with a given employer. A ten point increase in the disparity between
academic abilities and skill requirements increases the probability that an employee will leave job by
2.3% any month. This result is consistent across subgroups of males/females, and those who did or
did not complete four-year college. Of particular note, this effect persists even when controlling for
the reported satisfaction and hourly compensation an employee receives from a job. This suggests
that the academic match between an employee and employer captures a unique determinant of job
tenure.
In contrast to the academic distance between individuals and their jobs, mechanical distance
does not appear to have a strong effect on job tenure. However, educational mismatch, as measured
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by the percentage of workers who reported a different education level requirement, does. A person
is 1.7% more likely to leave a job in a given month if his or her occupation requires ten percent
more workers outside his or her education level. This impact appears stronger for females (rather
than males) and those who did not complete four-year college (rather than those who did). Unlike
the role of academic distance in job match, educational mismatch appears to manifest itself in job
satisfaction and hourly compensation, more proximate causes of leaving a job. In other words,
controlling for these two job characteristics leaves no effect for educational mismatch on job tenure.
When I convert my measures of job match into discrete measures that reflects the direction of
mismatch (over- or under-), my findings remain. Point estimates of hazard ratios reported in column
4 of Table 2.8 demonstrate that being either academically under-skilled, or over-skilled, both make
a person more likely to leave a job. Being either under-educated or over-educated also appears to
make a person more likely to leave a job. With educational mismatch measures a differentiation
does prove helpful, however. Those who are undereducated for a job are around three times more
likely to leave that job than those who are over-educated. While the point estimates of these dummy
variables are often insignificant, in sum, such findings support the idea that an absolute measure of
distance between employee and occupation is appropriate as a determinant of job tenure.
The conversion of my measures into dummy variables also permits to study the effects
of excluding individual, or occupational characteristics in the analysis of job tenure. Columns 1
to 3 of Table 2.8 suggest that significant bias is introduced when individual and/or occupational
characteristics used in mismatch measures are excluded. When occupational measures are not
controlled for, the impact of being academically under-skilled flips direction and gains statistical
significance. The role of being academically over-skilled is similarly inflated. I use this fact to argue
that many measures of skill mismatches simply reflect the tendency for low-skill jobs to have high
turnover rates, rather than capture the true effect of employee-job mismatch. In a similar vein, as
individual and occupational controls for educational mismatch are added, the relative magnitude of
being under-educated significantly increases while the effect of being over-educated decreases. Again,
this provides strong evidence that occupations with certain educational requirements inherently exert
different influences on the job tenure of employers within that occupation.
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2.6 Conclusion
Despite a slowdown over the last ten years, young adults continue to switch jobs regularly
at the start of their careers. Such mobility is often viewed as an information-seeking activity and
contributes to early wage growth at the onset of young adult careers. To investigate the determinants
of job mobility amongst young adults I created three measures of match quality between a worker
and employer. All three measures are constructed using individual-level variables (academic and
mechanical test scores of an individual, as well as his or her education level) compared to occupation-
level variables (academic and technical occupational skill, as well as educational requirements). The
skill mismatch measures adhere to assignment theory, measuring the absolute distance between a
person’s ability percentile and the occupation’s skill requirement percentile.
Through the use of Cox proportional hazard models I find mixed evidence regarding the
importance of my three measures. Academic distance holds the strongest, most robust and significant
negative impact on job tenure. The further an occupation’s academic skill requirements from an
individual’s academic ability test scores, the higher probability a worker will leave his or her job.
This effect is robust to the inclusion of job satisfaction and compensation measures, suggesting it
captures a unique dimension of job mobility for young adults. I find little evidence that mechanical
distance, however, is an important determinant of job tenure. Educational mismatch does lead to
higher job turnover, yet this effect is absorbed when job satisfaction and compensation are controlled
for. Further tests suggest that being over- or under-skilled (as well as over- or under-educated) for a
position both negatively impact job tenure justifying the use of absolute distance measures of match
quality.
Notably, my measures of mismatch were constructed from individual variables matched
to occupational variables, rather than individual survey responses. This allows me to control for
underlying components of the employee-job match. I demonstrate that jobs that require fewer
academic skills, fewer technical skills, and lower levels of education, all have a tendency to have
higher turnover, regardless of employee. Therefore, I argue that my measures of job match best
isolate the impact of employee-job match on tenure. Brief tests support this claim, as the estimated
impact on job tenure of under- or over-matched skills and education significantly change given
occupational and individual controls.
My research suggests a number of future explorations. The first, natural extension is to
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investigate the role of these skill and educational mismatches on earnings. Second, an exploration
of how the accumulation of skill-specific capital can accrue using O*NET measures of occupational
skill could also improve my model. Finally, a investigation into the underlying mechanisms of job
separation could prove fruitful. For example, while being over-skilled may lead to a person being
more likely to change employment voluntarily, being under-skilled may increase the odds of being
laid off. A competing hazards model of involuntary and voluntary job termination in this situation
could yield a deeper understanding of young adults and their job mobility.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean S.D. Min. Max.
Year 2008.3 3.35 1998 2014
Individual Characteristics
Age 25.99 3.40 18 34
Female 0.43 0.49 0 1
Black 0.20 0.40 0 1
Hispanic 0.18 0.39 0 1
Married 0.30 0.46 0 1
Cohabiting 0.18 0.38 0 1
Any Children 0.36 0.48 0 1
Academic Ability Percentile 49.53 28.40 0 100
Mechanical Ability Percentile 49.38 29.22 0 99
Some College 0.29 0.45 0 1
Associate’s Degree 0.09 0.29 0 1
Bachelor’s Degree 0.30 0.46 0 1
Master’s Degree 0.05 0.21 0 1
Advanced Degree 0.01 0.12 0 1
Occupational Characteristics
Academic Skill Percentile 48.25 28.20 0.10 99.99
Technical Skill Percentile 50.30 30.05 0.03 100
HS Diploma Required (%) 45.49 28.18 0 100
Some College Required (%) 8.06 7.50 0 56.77
Associate’s Required (%) 7 8.80 0 82.75
Bachelor’s Required (%) 21.92 27.20 0 93.39
Master’s Required (%) 4.34 9.73 0 82
Advanced Required (%) 2.84 10.87 0 100
Job-Match Measures
Academic Distance 24.60 19.14 0 96.61
Mechanical Distance 31.05 22.94 0.01 98.48
Percentage Less Education Level 43.69 35.07 0 100.02
Percentage Above Education Level 19.90 24.18 0 100
Percentage Not At Education Level 63.59 30.10 0 100
Hourly Compensation 18.38 7.66 6.82 49.13
Job Satisfaction 3.89 1.05 1 5
Monthly Observations 226,338
Unique Person-Job Observations 11,332
Unique Person Observations 3,703
1 All statistics reported above are calculated for the full monthly sample of 226,338 observations.
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Table 2.2: Occupations by Independent Skill Requirement Quintiles
Quintile Academic Skill Technical Skill
First Janitors and Building Cleaners Waiters and Waitresses
Dishwashers Counselors
Construction Laborers Bookkeeping, Accounting, and Auditing Clerks
Second Shipping, Receiving, and Traffic Clerks Nursing, Psychiatric, and Home Health Aides
Carpenters Sales Representatives, Wholesale and Manufacturing
Inspectors, Testers, Sorters, Samplers, and Weighers Real Estate Brokers and Sales Agents
Third Cashiers Cooks
Human Resources, Training, and Labor Relations Specialists Elementary and Middle School Teachers
General and Operations Managers Physicians and Surgeons
Fourth Licensed Practical and Licensed Vocational Nurses Driver/Sales Workers and Truck Drivers
Bookkeeping, Accounting, and Auditing Clerks Designers
Postsecondary Teachers Construction Managers
Fifth Computer and Information Automotive Service Technicians and Mechanics
Mechanical Engineers Carpenters
Pharmacists Industrial Production Managers
Table 2.3: Correlation of Job Match Measures
Academic Distance Mechanical Distance Not Education (%)
Academic Distance 1.000
Mechanical Distance -0.038 1.000
Not Education (%) 0.177 -0.034 1.000
1 The above displays the correlation between the denoted measures for 11,332 person-occupation matches within
the NLSY97.
Table 2.4: Job Tenure Statistics
Mean S.D. Min. Max. Median
Job Tenure in Months 23.22 25.56 1 173 14
1 Job tenure statistics reported are calculated for the 11,332 person-occupation matches within
the NLSY97.
Table 2.5: Change in Mismatch Measures Across Job Transitions
Change In
Academic Distance Mechanical Distance Different Education (%)
Change from 1st to 2nd -0.61 0.05 -2.49
Change from 2nd to 3rd -1.05 -0.55 -0.56
Change from 3rd to 4th 0.38 1.62 1.35
Change from 4th to 5th -1.33 0.29 -0.50
Change from 5th to 6th 0.74 1.72 0.67
Change from Adt’l Changes 0.21 -0.41 0.67
Total -0.47 0.23 -0.76
1 The change in job measures are reported for each observed job transition an individual makes within the NLSY97.
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Table 2.6. Estimated Job Exit Hazard Ratios
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Academic Distance 1.0023∗∗∗ 1.0013 1.0026∗∗∗ 1.0025∗∗ 1.0020∗∗∗ 1.0030∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0014)
Mechanical Distance 1.0002 1.0004 1.0009 0.9988 1.0001 1.0005
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0010) (0.0006) (0.0014)
Percentage Not at Education Level 1.0017∗∗ 1.0023∗∗ 1.0004 1.0031∗∗∗ 1.0017 0.9976
(0.0007) (0.0011) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0022)
Academic Ability 1.0003 1.0013 0.9992 1.0014 0.9997 1.0026
(0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0016)
Mechanical Ability 0.9993 1.0008 1.0002 0.9986 0.9994 0.9993
(0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0008) (0.0016)
SomeCollege 0.9684 0.9185 1.0579 0.8855∗ 0.9696
(0.0455) (0.0674) (0.0680) (0.0615) (0.0649)
Associate 0.9168 0.8085∗∗ 0.9521 0.8971 0.9064
(0.0521) (0.0701) (0.0721) (0.0758) (0.0732)
Bachelor 1.1502∗∗∗ 1.0760 1.1423∗∗ 1.1633∗∗
(0.0546) (0.0785) (0.0745) (0.0819)
Master 0.8406∗ 0.5851∗∗∗ 0.8199 0.8349 0.9364
(0.0791) (0.0878) (0.1313) (0.0996) (0.1259)
Advanced Degree 1.0642 1.2760 0.6902 1.3425 1.1107
(0.1850) (0.3229) (0.2188) (0.2886) (0.2410)
Academic Skill 0.9965∗∗∗ 0.9972∗∗ 0.9965∗∗∗ 0.9965∗∗∗ 0.9967∗∗∗ 0.9965∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0015)
Technical Skill 0.9985∗∗∗ 0.9982∗∗ 0.9985∗∗ 0.9987∗ 0.9982∗∗∗ 1.0001
(0.0004) (0.0008) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0005) (0.0012)
HS Diploma Req (%) 0.9932∗∗∗ 0.9957∗∗ 0.9918∗∗∗ 0.9945∗∗∗ 0.9935∗∗∗ 0.9908∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0013) (0.0033)
Some College Req (%) 0.9897∗∗∗ 0.9917∗∗∗ 0.9849∗∗∗ 0.9935∗∗ 0.9901∗∗∗ 0.9860∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0047)
Associate’s Req (%) 0.9939∗∗∗ 0.9969 0.9940∗∗ 0.9943∗∗ 0.9948∗∗∗ 0.9895∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0042)
Bachelor’s Req (%) 0.9915∗∗∗ 0.9941∗∗∗ 0.9918∗∗∗ 0.9915∗∗∗ 0.9928∗∗∗ 0.9850∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0014) (0.0036)
Master’s Req (%) 0.9918∗∗∗ 0.9960 0.9895∗∗∗ 0.9930∗∗ 0.9881∗∗∗ 0.9891∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0030) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0040) (0.0036)
Advanced Req (%) 0.9905∗∗∗ 0.9894∗∗∗ 0.9924∗∗ 0.9899∗∗∗ 0.9938 0.9825∗∗∗
(0.0025) (0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0053) (0.0045)
Subsamples
First Jobs X
Male X
Female X
Below Bachelors X
Bachelors and Above X
Observations 226,338 89,837 129,399 96,939 155,307 71,031
Failures 6,822 2,445 3,992 2,830 5,187 1,635
Individuals 3,703 3,377 1,896 1,807 2,362 1,364
1 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
2 The above table reports hazard ratios of an individual’s monthly propensity to stop working for a given employer. The model
is stratified at the sequential job number for a given individual, and errors are clustered at the individual level.
3 Age, gender, race, marriage, cohabitation and child variables are included in estimation, but not reported here for brevity.
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Table 2.7. Estimated Job Exit Hazard Ratios with Job Pay & Satisfaction
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Academic Distance 1.0023∗∗∗ 1.0027∗∗∗ 1.0019∗∗∗ 1.0023∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Mechanical Distance 1.0002 1.0001 0.9999 0.9997
(0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Percentage Not At Education Level 1.0017∗∗ 1.0007 1.0008 1.0000
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008)
Satisfaction
Level=2 0.8262∗∗∗ 0.8399∗∗∗
(0.0435) (0.0465)
Level=3 0.4771∗∗∗ 0.5025∗∗∗
(0.0220) (0.0244)
Level=4 0.3458∗∗∗ 0.3787∗∗∗
(0.0164) (0.0189)
Level=5 0.2632∗∗∗ 0.3046∗∗∗
(0.0131) (0.0161)
Compensation 0.9339∗∗∗ 0.9461∗∗∗
(0.0031) (0.0031)
Observations 226,338 220,856 198,378 193,635
Failures 6,822 5,647 6,061 5,045
Individuals 3,703 3,663 3,594 3,551
1 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
2 The above table reports hazard ratios of an individual’s monthly propensity to stop working for a given employer. The
model is stratified at the sequential job number for a given individual, and errors are clustered at the individual level.
3 Individual, as well as occupation characteristics are included in all estimations, but not reported here for brevity.
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Table 2.8. Estimated Job Exit Hazard Ratios with Dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Academically Under-skilled 0.9477∗ 0.9011∗∗∗ 1.0131 1.0305
(0.0303) (0.0298) (0.0358) (0.0417)
Academically Over-skilled 1.1509∗∗∗ 1.2297∗∗∗ 1.0814∗∗ 1.0588
(0.0362) (0.0410) (0.0358) (0.0424)
Mechanically Under-skilled 1.0537 0.9959 1.0503 1.0440
(0.0353) (0.0354) (0.0374) (0.0428)
Mechanically Over-skilled 1.0217 1.0668∗ 1.0238 1.0197
(0.0337) (0.0358) (0.0389) (0.0419)
Under-educated 1.0060 1.0628 1.1217∗∗∗ 1.2228∗∗∗
(0.0391) (0.0439) (0.0490) (0.0585)
Over-educated 1.1902∗∗∗ 1.2655∗∗∗ 1.0785∗∗ 1.0659
(0.0350) (0.0441) (0.0367) (0.0462)
Academic Ability 0.9968∗∗∗ 1.0005
(0.0009) (0.0010)
Mechanical Ability 0.9984∗∗ 0.9995
(0.0008) (0.0009)
Some College 0.8961∗∗∗ 1.0206
(0.0366) (0.0445)
Associate 0.8294∗∗∗ 0.9660
(0.0456) (0.0547)
Bachelor 0.9779 1.2436∗∗∗
(0.0457) (0.0692)
Master 0.7282∗∗∗ 0.8899
(0.0673) (0.0858)
Advanced Degree 0.8561 1.1454
(0.1075) (0.2033)
Academic Skill 0.9971∗∗∗ 0.9966∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0010)
Technical Skill 0.9981∗∗∗ 0.9984∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0007)
HS Diploma Req (%) 0.9931∗∗∗ 0.9929∗∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0012)
Some College Req (%) 0.9890∗∗∗ 0.9879∗∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0021)
Associate’s Req (%) 0.9935∗∗∗ 0.9926∗∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0018)
Bachelor’s Req (%) 0.9917∗∗∗ 0.9900∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0014)
Master’s Req (%) 0.9911∗∗∗ 0.9898∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0023)
Advanced Req (%) 0.9904∗∗∗ 0.9881∗∗∗
(0.0019) (0.0026)
Observations 226,338 226,338 226,338 226,338
Failures 6,822 6,822 6,822 6,822
Individuals 3,703 3,703 3,703 3,703
1 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
2 The above table reports hazard ratios of an individual’s monthly propensity to stop working for a given employer.
The model is stratified at the sequential job number for a given individual, and errors are clustered at the
individual level.
3 Age, gender, race, marriage, cohabitation and child variables are included in estimation, but not reported here
for brevity.
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2.7 Figures
Figure 2.1: Individual Ability Scores
The above figure plots the reported ability scores for 3,703 respondents from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY97).
Figure 2.2: Reported Importance Level of Required Skills in Occupations
The above figure plots the importance of denoted skills for 461 occupations, defined by 2000 Census codes. The range of
importance was from 0 to 7.
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Figure 2.3: Individual Ability Percentile Distributions
The above figure plots the ability scores in percentile terms for 3,703 respondents from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY97).
Figure 2.4: Relationship between Academic and Mechanical Abilities
The above figure plots the abilities of 3,703 respondents from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97).
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Figure 2.5: Academic and Technical Occupational Skill Requirements
The above figure plots 461 occupations, defined by 2000 Census codes, across the reported skill requirements in percentile
measures.
Figure 2.6: Academic and Technical Occupational Skill Requirements with Labels
The above figure plots 461 occupations, defined by 2000 Census codes, across the reported skill requirements in percentile
measures.
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Figure 2.7: Bivariate Densities of Occupational Skill Requirements
The above figure plots a bivariate density of 461 occupations, defined by 2000 Census codes, across the reported skill
requirements in percentile measures. The top plot simply weights occupations equally, whereas the bottom plot weights
occupations by the number of FTE workers observed in the CPS.
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Figure 2.8: Bivariate Densities of Occupational Skill Requirements within Sample
The above figure plots a bivariate density of the academic and technical skill requirements observed for the 11,332 person-
occupation matches observed within my NLSY97 sample.
Figure 2.9: Histograms of Occupational Match Measures by Unique Person-Job
The above figure plots histograms of the denoted measures for 11,332 person-occupation matches observed within my NLSY97
sample.
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Figure 2.10: Histograms of Unique Employers by Person
The above figure plots a histogram of the number of unique employers held by 3,703 individuals within the NLSY97.
Figure 2.11: Job Duration
The above figure plots histograms of job tenure and corresponding survival rate of person-job match for 11,332 person-job
matches observed within my NLSY97 sample..
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Figure 2.12: Skill Mismatches on Job Tenure
The above figure plots locally weighted regression of job tenure across occupation match measures for 11,332 person-job
matches observed within my NLSY97 sample. Final jobs with censored end dates are not included.
Figure 2.13: Educational Mismatches on Job Tenure
The above figure plots locally weighted regression of job tenure across occupation match measures for 11,332 person-job
matches observed within my NLSY97 sample. Final jobs with censored end dates are not included.
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Figure 2.14: Change in Skill Mismatches on Change in Job Tenure
The above figure plots locally weighted regression of how the change in a job’s skill mismatch affects the new job’s relative
tenure across occupation match measures for 11,332 person-job observed within my NLSY97 sample. Final jobs with censored
end dates are not included.
Figure 2.15: Change in Educational Mismatch on Change in Job Tenure
The above figure plots locally weighted regression of how the change in a job’s educational mismatch affects the new job’s
relative tenure across occupation match measures for 11,332 person-job matches observed within my NLSY97 sample. Final
jobs with censored end dates are not included.
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Appendix A Assignment of Fields within Two- and Four-
Year Colleges
The NLSY97 has extensive data regarding college enrollment, but often incomplete in-
formation about major choice. For this reason, the process of assigning a CTE or STEM des-
ignation is somewhat involved. The most precise source of data on college courses is derived
from actual college transcript data provided by the BLS. Each course a student takes within a
two-year college is classified as within a CTE field or not. Table 1 provides a dichotomy of
the courses within and outside CTE fields. This classification is available online at https://
nces.ed.gov/surveys/ctes/tables/postsec_tax.asp and STEM classifications are available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2011/2011226.pdf. The courses taken are then totaled, and the per-
centage of courses that are CTE is calculated. If at least 33% of the courses a two-year college
student took were CTE the student is classified as majoring within a CTE field. Those who did not
meet that percentage are classified as non-CTE students. However, records on college courses do
not exist for all two-year college attendees. Classification relied on the last major within a college
level reported by an individual if that person’s college courses were not available. Prior to 2012,
the NLSY97 classification of majors did not coincide with the standard Classification of Instruction
Programs (CIP) used to classify CTE courses. Therefore, majors were matched with a reasonable
level of certainty to their CIP counterparts. If students who lacked college course data had a major
within a CTE field they were then assigned to be within a CTE field at a two-year college. The
remaining individuals who lacked college course and major information were classified as non-CTE
students. This occurred for 12% of two-year students. A similar process was repeated for four-year
students in order to assign STEM majors. Among four-year students, 4% did not have college course
information or a reported major and consequently were labeled within a non-STEM field.
75
Table 1: Classification of Two-Year Courses and Majors
Liberal Arts (Academic) Education Career and Technical Education (CTE)
Anthropology Accounting
Area/ethnic studies Agriculture
Biological/life sciences Apparel and textiles
Economics Architecture
Fine/performing arts (excludes design) Business support
Foreign languages Child Care
Geography Communications technologies
History Computer and information sciences
Interdisciplinary studies Construction
Letters/English Design
Liberal/general studies Education
Mathematics Engineering
Philosophy and religion Engineering technologies
Physical sciences Entrepreneurship
Political Science/Government Family Studies
Psychology Finance management
Sociology Health sciences
Journalism and other communications
Law/legal studies
Library sciences
Management Information Systems
Manufacturing
Marketing
Military technologies
Natural resources/conservation
Nutrition Services
Parks, recreation and fitness
Personal and culinary services
Protective services
Public administration and social service
Real estate
Repair
Sales and merchandising
Science technologies
Theology
Transportation
1 Classification by the National Center for Education Statistics and available online at https://nces.ed.
gov/surveys/ctes/tables/postsec_tax.asp
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Appendix B Imputation of Lifetime Earnings
As the earnings of all respondents within the NLSY97 is only available up until age 30, I
impute future earnings using Current Population Survey (CPS) and American Communities Survey
(ACS) data. I use both samples because the CPS accurately measures the type of two-year associate
degree attained (either vocational or academic) but not four-year degree, whereas the ACS records
whether a bachelor (but not associate) degree was awarded in a STEM or non-STEM field.
The CPS provides baseline earnings of workers between the ages of 25 and 60 that were
observed between 1992 and 2015. Unfortunately, the CPS denotes workers’ education by final
college degree, with college attendees who did not complete a degree being separately denoted as
having ‘some college’ education. In constructing my estimates of earnings after college programs,
I used completion rates within the NLSY97 to create a sample comprised of a roughly equivalent
percentages of those who finished after attaining a degree, and those who finished without a degree.
I collapsed these earnings observations across groups defined by race and gender. This provided me
with lifetime earning trajectories for high school graduates, two-year non-CTE, two-year CTE and
grouped four-year attendees.
To calculate the earnings discrepancies between STEM and non-STEM fields across ages I
use ACS data collected between 2008 and 2015 (years when four-year college majors were distin-
guished). I again collapse the expected earnings of race-gender groups to examine relative rates of
return between STEM and non-STEM fields across ages. I then used this data to infer the differ-
ences in earnings among workers after a four-year college degree within the CPS, conditional on
their STEM or non-STEM classification.
Ultimately, this data allowed me to impute lifetime earnings using historically observed
growth rates of six demographic groups after five different college options. I use the predicted
earnings of an individual at age 30 to serve as a baseline of earnings and multiply by my estimate
of earnings growth relative to 30 of every age. While more refined predictions of wage growth, for
example conditioned on abilities or earning trends prior to age 30, would be ideal, I was unable to
identify such matching characteristics from the available cross-sectional data. Confidence intervals
reported within the paper should be interpreted very cautiously. I perform Monte Carlo simulations
on expected lifetime earnings, yet for each draw I attach the same expected path of earnings growth.
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Appendix C Decomposition of Earnings
Monthly earnings estimated within this paper are a product of hourly compensation and
the hours worked in a month. Tables 2 and 3 present parameter estimates of how ability scores
and other variables impact log compensation and log monthly hours. The role of ability scores on
monthly earnings appear mostly driven by their impact on compensation, not hours worked.
Table 2. Determinants of Log Hourly Compensation - Selection Corrected
Two Year Four Year
No College Non-CTE CTE Non-STEM STEM
Verbal Ability −0.0007 −0.0009 −0.0055∗∗ −0.0003 0.0062∗
(0.0013) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0012) (0.0035)
Math Ability 0.0064∗∗∗ 0.0045 0.0038 0.0034∗∗ 0.0015
(0.0018) (0.0028) (0.0034) (0.0015) (0.0044)
Mechanical Ability 0.0013 0.0012 0.0045∗∗ −0.0011 −0.0062∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0019) (0.0010) (0.0031)
Female −0.1483∗∗∗ −0.1098∗ −0.1333∗∗ −0.0383 −0.0204
(0.0314) (0.0566) (0.0552) (0.0302) (0.0732)
Black −0.0017 0.0249 −0.1311 −0.0497 −0.1850
(0.0497) (0.0743) (0.0887) (0.0432) (0.1223)
Hispanic −0.0044 0.0472 −0.0870 −0.0107 0.0854
(0.0469) (0.0736) (0.0820) (0.0435) (0.0998)
Log Parent Income (Thous.) 0.0970∗∗∗ 0.0753∗∗∗ 0.0683∗∗ 0.0596∗∗∗ 0.1087∗∗
(0.0155) (0.0286) (0.0309) (0.0173) (0.0469)
Highest Parent Grade 0.0036 0.0100 −0.0014 0.0025 0.0033
(0.0104) (0.0158) (0.0197) (0.0087) (0.0201)
Age in Months 0.0117∗∗∗ 0.0045 0.0061 0.0162∗∗∗ 0.0202∗∗∗
(0.0023) (0.0040) (0.0042) (0.0032) (0.0066)
Age2 / 1000 −0.0156∗∗∗ −0.0031 −0.0039 −0.0187∗∗∗ −0.0274∗∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0050) (0.0102)
Constant 0.1517 2.2138∗∗ 1.0068 −0.8742 0.3233
(0.4194) (0.8746) (1.1185) (0.6361) (1.6906)
Ancillary Measures
σ2 0.3182∗∗ 0.7609 0.8691 0.2350∗∗ 0.9871
(0.1414) (0.5138) (0.7164) (0.1108) (0.7152)
ρ1 −0.0121 1.2117∗∗ 1.2123∗∗ −0.2264 0.7348
(0.2153) (0.5629) (0.5683) (0.6489) (0.8878)
ρ2 −0.3764 −0.0967 −0.4168 −0.9590∗ −0.4321
(0.4990) (0.1913) (0.6279) (0.5806) (0.9242)
ρ3 0.6979 0.1095 0.2879 0.6667 −0.7846
(0.6376) (0.6413) (0.2005) (0.7180) (0.9429)
ρ4 0.3947 1.3054
∗∗∗ 0.7496 0.2040 1.6929∗∗∗
(0.4905) (0.4358) (0.4936) (0.1887) (0.6141)
ρ5 2.1261
∗∗∗ 1.0569 1.4704∗∗∗ −0.8668 −0.4093
(0.5404) (0.6708) (0.5571) (0.5954) (0.3026)
Location Controls X X X X X
Yearly FE X X X X X
Correction P-value 0.012 0.058 0.080 0.181 0.197
Observations 91,614 32,710 31,542 86,309 20,797
Individuals 956 458 450 1,437 353
R2 0.283 0.204 0.252 0.222 0.295
1 The above table lists the results of regressions of log hourly compensation on separate self-selected samples within the NLSY97
2 Standard errors in parentheses are the results of 500 bootstraps clustered at the individual level.
3 Correction terms are included in each regression, but not listed in the regression. Ancilliary measures capture the effect of these covariates.
Specifically, σ2 is a scaling parameters and ρj measures the correlation between the unexpected deviation in monthly log earnings and the
unexpected deviation of an individual in choosing schooling option j.
4 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
78
Table 3. Determinants of Log Monthly Hours - Selection Corrected
Two Year Four Year
No College Non-CTE CTE Non-STEM STEM
Verbal Ability −0.0016∗∗∗ −0.0005 0.0004 −0.0005 −0.0009
(0.0006) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0015)
Math Ability −0.0003 0.0003 0.0021∗ 0.0009 0.0013
(0.0008) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0007) (0.0020)
Mechanical Ability 0.0009∗∗ −0.0002 −0.0002 0.0008 0.0013
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0013)
Female −0.0967∗∗∗ −0.0704∗∗∗ −0.0875∗∗∗ −0.0181 −0.0466
(0.0148) (0.0241) (0.0216) (0.0135) (0.0294)
Black −0.0324 −0.0300 −0.0155 0.0121 −0.0550
(0.0233) (0.0359) (0.0329) (0.0187) (0.0516)
Hispanic −0.0046 −0.0084 0.0176 −0.0021 −0.0428
(0.0204) (0.0336) (0.0317) (0.0182) (0.0379)
Log Parent Income (Thous.) 0.0088 0.0095 0.0086 0.0171∗∗ 0.0180
(0.0070) (0.0122) (0.0118) (0.0069) (0.0201)
Highest Parent Grade −0.0091∗ −0.0090 0.0030 0.0021 0.0002
(0.0047) (0.0076) (0.0067) (0.0036) (0.0102)
Age in Months 0.0022∗ 0.0013 0.0034 0.0069∗∗∗ 0.0094∗∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0023) (0.0026) (0.0017) (0.0033)
Age2 / 1000 −0.0029 −0.0023 −0.0040 −0.0094∗∗∗ −0.0134∗∗∗
(0.0020) (0.0036) (0.0041) (0.0026) (0.0051)
Constant 3.2033∗∗∗ 3.3621∗∗∗ 2.4965∗∗∗ 2.4180∗∗∗ 2.1901∗∗∗
(0.2132) (0.4409) (0.5211) (0.3212) (0.8085)
Ancillary Measures
σ2 0.0565∗ 0.0685 0.0640 0.0627∗∗ 0.0898
(0.0291) (0.0654) (0.0493) (0.0255) (0.1148)
ρ1 0.2251 −0.1388 −0.5444 −0.7530 0.6770
(0.1852) (0.7640) (0.7448) (0.5945) (0.8535)
ρ2 0.0740 0.2478 0.6694 −0.2897 −0.9235
(0.4701) (0.2047) (0.6385) (0.5229) (0.8953)
ρ3 −1.0764∗ −0.7848 −0.3884∗ 1.0244∗ 1.0890
(0.6107) (0.7606) (0.2156) (0.5933) (0.9298)
ρ4 −0.4584 −0.8170 −0.0746 −0.1575 0.4740
(0.4428) (0.7036) (0.6561) (0.1734) (0.6974)
ρ5 0.0515 0.7370 1.1325
∗ 0.2365 0.2925
(0.6927) (0.8211) (0.6173) (0.5779) (0.3147)
Location Controls X X X X X
Yearly FE X X X X X
Correction P-value 0.571 0.769 0.225 0.554 0.774
Observations 93,791 33,198 31,841 86,309 21,743
Individuals 956 458 450 1,437 353
R2 0.083 0.049 0.099 0.222 0.097
1 The above table lists the results of regressions of log hourly compensation on separate self-selected samples within the NLSY97
2 Standard errors in parentheses are the results of 500 bootstraps clustered at the individual level.
3 Correction terms are included in each regression, but not listed in the regression. Ancilliary measures capture the effect of these covariates.
Specifically, σ2 is a scaling parameters and ρj measures the correlation between the unexpected deviation in monthly log earnings and the
unexpected deviation of an individual in choosing schooling option j.
4 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
79
Appendix D Estimation on Male Sample
This section estimates how abilities affect earnings and counterfactual earnings across college
programs solely for males to ensure that different average ability scores, or labor supply decisions,
between men and women do not drive this paper’s results. The positive impact of mechanical ability
after CTE programs remains, as does the percentage of males expected to earn more after a CTE
program than either four-year college program.
Table 4. Postsecondary Schooling Choice for Males - Average Change in Marginal Probabilities
Two Year Four Year
No College Non-CTE CTE Non-STEM STEM
Verbal Ability −0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗ −0.0008 0.0036∗∗∗ −0.0007∗
(0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Math Ability −0.0040∗∗∗ −0.0013∗∗∗ −0.0002 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Mechanical Ability 0.0018∗∗∗ −0.0006 0.0010∗∗ −0.0033∗∗∗ 0.0011∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0004)
Black −0.0742∗∗∗ −0.0288 0.0076 0.0401 0.0553∗∗
(0.0270) (0.0228) (0.0251) (0.0349) (0.0261)
Hispanic −0.0962∗∗∗ 0.0395 0.0172 −0.0108 0.0502∗
(0.0286) (0.0268) (0.0275) (0.0310) (0.0276)
Log Parent Income (Thous.) −0.0075 −0.0089 −0.0259∗∗∗ 0.0267 0.0156
(0.0139) (0.0104) (0.0100) (0.0180) (0.0114)
Highest Parent Grade −0.0361∗∗∗ 0.0030 −0.0017 0.0217∗∗∗ 0.0132∗∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0044) (0.0026)
2-Year Cost (Thous.) 0.0169∗ −0.0151 −0.0120 0.0114 −0.0012
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0083) (0.0109) (0.0088)
4-Year Cost (Thous.) 0.0039 −0.0023 0.0155∗∗ −0.0128 −0.0042
(0.0071) (0.0075) (0.0063) (0.0089) (0.0071)
4Yr Distance / 2Yr+4Yr Distance −0.1346∗∗ 0.0554 0.1597∗∗ −0.0172 −0.0633∗
(0.0557) (0.0685) (0.0658) (0.0589) (0.0361)
County % of 2Yr CTE Degrees 0.0211 −0.0413 −0.0258 0.0005 0.0455
(0.0473) (0.0324) (0.0377) (0.0447) (0.0443)
County % of 4Yr STEM Degrees −0.0266 −0.0410 0.0183 0.0171 0.0321
(0.0554) (0.0667) (0.0517) (0.0502) (0.0499)
Baseline Probability 0.310 0.121 0.127 0.334 0.108
College Access Instruments χ2(20) = 32.547 P-Value=0.038
Income X College Costs χ2(8) = 9.357 P-Value=0.313
All Instruments χ2(28) = 57.580 P-Value=0.001
Pseudo R2 0.180
Individuals 1,758
1 The above table lists the results of one multinomial logistic regression regarding the postsecondary choices of male respondents in the
NLSY97 sample. The change in marginal probabilities are calculated for each individual and the average change is reported above.
2 Ten measures of employment within industries tied to respondents’ county prior to high school graduation are included in the above
regressions. Interactions of college cost and log parent income are also included - these effects are reported within the marginal effect
of costs and parent income separately.
3 Standard errors listed in parentheses are computed from a bootstrap procedure clustered by county of residence 10 months prior to
high school graduation.
4 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 5. Determinants of Monthly Log Earnings for Males
Two Year Four Year
No College Non-CTE CTE Non-STEM STEM
Verbal Ability −0.0050∗∗∗ −0.0019 −0.0047 −0.0017 0.0024
(0.0018) (0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0022) (0.0054)
Math Ability 0.0028 0.0058 0.0075 −0.0019 0.0098
(0.0023) (0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0029) (0.0074)
Mechanical Ability 0.0044∗∗∗ 0.0009 0.0032 0.0006 −0.0060
(0.0013) (0.0024) (0.0028) (0.0021) (0.0059)
Black −0.0847 0.0422 −0.1687 −0.1903∗∗ −0.3257
(0.0633) (0.1087) (0.1281) (0.0831) (0.2450)
Hispanic −0.0432 −0.0115 −0.1124 0.0115 −0.0684
(0.0680) (0.1100) (0.1426) (0.0810) (0.1895)
Log Parent Income (Thous.) 0.1134∗∗∗ 0.1358∗∗∗ 0.0722 0.0583∗ 0.1399∗
(0.0242) (0.0450) (0.0481) (0.0320) (0.0788)
Highest Parent Grade −0.0211 −0.0139 0.0181 −0.0103 0.0002
(0.0148) (0.0259) (0.0316) (0.0167) (0.0374)
Age in Months 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.0046 0.0059 0.0169∗∗∗ 0.0228∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0075) (0.0072) (0.0061) (0.0111)
Age2 / 1000 −0.0157∗∗ −0.0018 0.0003 −0.0167∗ −0.0314∗
(0.0067) (0.0118) (0.0113) (0.0099) (0.0169)
Constant 5.1716∗∗∗ 6.9735∗∗∗ 4.7534∗∗∗ 4.5147∗∗∗ 4.0704
(0.6097) (1.5758) (1.4404) (1.1089) (2.5639)
Ancillary Measures
σ2 0.2886∗ 0.2847 0.3966 0.4483∗ 1.2568
(0.1484) (0.6272) (0.4764) (0.2353) (1.3737)
ρ 1 0.0990 0.3017 −0.1700 0.3243 −1.0685
(0.2367) (0.8577) (0.8763) (0.7098) (1.0680)
ρ 2 −0.4628 −0.4799∗∗ −1.1990 1.1650 −1.6304∗
(0.5450) (0.2390) (0.8320) (0.7406) (0.9730)
ρ 3 −0.0156 −0.5610 −0.0122 −0.6455 −0.2372
(0.5720) (0.8250) (0.2473) (0.7562) (0.8251)
ρ 4 −0.8765 0.9456 0.3785 0.0298 0.2561
(0.6232) (0.8058) (0.7404) (0.2259) (0.7409)
ρ 5 1.4157∗ −0.1505 1.2627 −0.9691 −0.5172
(0.7401) (0.9048) (0.9168) (0.6558) (0.3319)
Location Controls X X X X X
Yearly FE X X X X X
Correction P-value 0.268 0.539 0.519 0.492 0.589
Observations 54,587 17,037 16,950 37,482 11,722
Individuals 545 212 223 588 190
R2 0.250 0.220 0.244 0.218 0.322
1 The above table lists the regression parameters of log earnings on separate self-selected samples within the NLSY97
2 Standard errors in parentheses are the results of 500 bootstraps clustered at the individual level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
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Table 6. Highest Expected Earnings by Terminal Degree at Age 30 for Males
Highest Expected Earnings At Age 30 From:
Associate Bachelor
Non-CTE CTE Non-STEM STEM Total
Weighted Counts
Number 31 253 581 1,005 1,870
Percent 1.65% 13.52% 30.97% 53.61% 100%
Ability Measures
Verbal 38.95 40.33 33.69 60.54 48.71
Math 36.47 38.79 31.18 65.62 50.3
Mechanical 42.37 67.64 41.37 63.64 56.13
Outcome Predictions
Monthly Earnings $3,754 $4,663 $4,047 $5,451 $4,850
Annual Earnings $45,048 $55,967 $48,571 $65,412 $58,210
Return 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.54 0.44
Actual College Attendance (%)
No College 42.11 49.25 43.65 18.63 31.09
Two Year College 26.32 27.86 26.4 22.75 24.64
Four Year College 31.58 22.89 29.95 58.61 44.27
Actual Program Attendance (%)
No College 42.11 49.25 43.65 18.63 31.09
Two Year Non-CTE 2.63 14.43 13.71 10.83 12.04
Two Year CTE 23.68 13.43 12.69 11.92 12.61
Four Year Non-STEM 26.32 19.4 24.37 42.58 33.43
Four Year STEM 5.26 3.48 5.58 16.03 10.84
1
Columns denote which college option is has the highest point estimate of expected earnings for high school graduates in my sample at the age of 30. The expected
returns are estimated from parameters in Table 5.
2 The first panel reports the number of high school graduates who have the highest expected earnings from within a program. Weights provided by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics are used to approximate the percentage of students in the national population who could benefit most from a given program.
3 Rows in the last two panels display the actual attendance of high school graduates in the sample. Within a column the number is a measure of the percentage
of respondents who have the highest predicted return from the college attendance option listed as a column header who actually attended the college listed in
the row. The second to last panel splits actual attendance by college level, whereas the last panel refines this to college program.
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Table 7. Determinants of Monthly Log Earnings with Degree Controls for Males
Two Year Four Year
No College Non-CTE CTE Non-STEM STEM
Verbal Ability −0.0050∗∗∗ −0.0022 −0.0035 −0.0015 0.0011
(0.0018) (0.0029) (0.0036) (0.0027) (0.0070)
Math Ability 0.0028 0.0057 0.0095∗ −0.0021 0.0019
(0.0023) (0.0046) (0.0052) (0.0031) (0.0094)
Mechanical Ability 0.0044∗∗∗ 0.0006 0.0022 0.0013 0.0047
(0.0013) (0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0075)
Terminal Degree −0.0532 0.0800 0.1697∗ 0.2930
(0.1476) (0.1468) (0.1026) (0.3040)
Degree X Verbal −0.0022 −0.0039 −0.0005 −0.0008
(0.0056) (0.0040) (0.0023) (0.0061)
Degree X Math 0.0029 −0.0000 0.0011 0.0104
(0.0051) (0.0037) (0.0019) (0.0069)
Degree X Mechanical 0.0037 0.0036 −0.0009 −0.0088
(0.0035) (0.0030) (0.0020) (0.0058)
Black −0.0847 0.0695 −0.1182 −0.1531∗ −0.2598
(0.0633) (0.1124) (0.1332) (0.0843) (0.2087)
Hispanic −0.0432 −0.0108 −0.0937 0.0313 −0.0405
(0.0680) (0.1099) (0.1474) (0.0813) (0.1713)
Log Parent Income (Thous.) 0.1134∗∗∗ 0.1400∗∗∗ 0.0645 0.0535 0.0988
(0.0242) (0.0438) (0.0500) (0.0329) (0.0767)
Highest Parent Grade −0.0211 −0.0116 0.0237 −0.0091 −0.0048
(0.0148) (0.0248) (0.0328) (0.0167) (0.0355)
Age in Months 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.0046 0.0035 0.0109∗ 0.0159
(0.0038) (0.0074) (0.0070) (0.0058) (0.0108)
Age2 / 1000 −0.0157∗∗ −0.0019 0.0036 −0.0082 −0.0201
(0.0067) (0.0116) (0.0112) (0.0094) (0.0166)
Constant 5.1716∗∗∗ 7.1067∗∗∗ 4.8508∗∗∗ 5.2666∗∗∗ 4.7770∗
(0.6097) (1.5173) (1.4658) (1.0890) (2.4959)
Ancillary Measures
σ2 0.2886∗ 0.3911 0.5467 0.3656 1.5697
(0.1484) (0.6485) (0.5435) (0.2248) (1.2123)
ρ1 0.0990 0.6654 −0.3417 0.0184 −1.1122
(0.2367) (0.8194) (0.8595) (0.7203) (1.0443)
ρ2 −0.4628 −0.4649∗ −1.3290 0.9486 −1.8104∗
(0.5450) (0.2392) (0.8192) (0.7728) (0.9542)
ρ3 −0.0156 −0.3211 0.0439 −0.4325 0.2752
(0.5720) (0.8025) (0.2530) (0.7863) (0.8639)
ρ4 −0.8765 1.2689∗ 0.3548 −0.0203 −0.0274
(0.6232) (0.7539) (0.7231) (0.2368) (0.7590)
ρ5 1.4157
∗ −0.1143 1.3291 −1.1257∗ −0.3719
(0.7401) (0.8883) (0.9269) (0.6536) (0.3303)
Location Controls X X X X X
Yearly FE X X X X X
Correction P-value 0.268 0.361 0.337 0.589 0.548
Observations 54,587 17,037 16,950 37,482 11,722
Individuals 545 212 223 588 190
R2 0.249 0.248 0.290 0.229 0.387
1 The above table lists the regression parameters of log earnings on separate self-selected samples within the NLSY97
2 Standard errors in parentheses are the results of 500 bootstraps clustered at the individual level. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01
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Appendix E Robustness Checks
This section presents further estimation of ability scores’ impact on earnings with the in-
clusion of non-cognitive abilities, behavioral indices, high school attainment and college outcomes.
Across all college programs, the inclusion of these variables do not significantly alter point estimates
of test scores’ impact on earnings.
Table 8. Monthly Log Earnings within No College Program - Additional Individual Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Verbal Ability −0.0023 −0.0021∗∗ −0.0037∗∗∗ −0.0037∗∗∗ −0.0014 −0.0016 −0.0024∗
(0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0015)
Math Ability 0.0061∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ 0.0022 0.0020 0.0035∗ 0.0039∗∗ 0.0023
(0.0022) (0.0012) (0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0016)
Mechanical Ability 0.0022∗∗ 0.0019∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ 0.0029∗∗∗ 0.0017∗ 0.0012 0.0019∗
(0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Mental Health 0.0008∗ 0.0008
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Pos. Expectations −0.0013 −0.0014
(0.0008) (0.0010)
Criminal Index −0.0157 −0.0104
(0.0153) (0.0161)
Substance Abuse Index −0.0114 0.0067
(0.0185) (0.0221)
HS Academic Creds 0.0000
(0.0000)
HS Vocational Creds 0.0001
(0.0002)
HS Academic Concentrator −0.0076
(0.0627)
HS Academic Specialist −0.0079
(0.0858)
HS Vocational Concentrator 0.0225
(0.0485)
HS Vocational Specialist −0.0243
(0.0415)
HS GPA −0.0525
(0.0779)
Constant 4.8213∗∗∗ 5.2311∗∗∗ 5.3914∗∗∗ 5.3717∗∗∗ 5.0813∗∗∗ 5.0179∗∗∗ 5.1486∗∗∗
(0.4508) (0.4595) (0.4498) (0.4649) (0.5166) (0.5366) (0.5577)
Location Controls X X X X X X X
Yearly FE X X X X X X X
Selection Correction X X X X X X X
Observations 91,340 82,079 82,079 82,079 66,546 59,684 65,836
Individuals 956 856 856 856 675 603 665
R2 0.276 0.270 0.272 0.272 0.285 0.290 0.281
1 Parameter estimates of selection corrected log earnings after mutually exclusive final schooling levels for respondents within the NLSY97 are
reported.
2 Standard errors in parentheses are not adjusted for the two-stage procedure, and should be interpreted cautiously.
3 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 9. Monthly Log Earnings within Non-CTE Programs - Individual Characteristic Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Verbal Ability −0.0014 −0.0012 −0.0019 −0.0001 −0.0014 −0.0007 −0.0034
(0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0022)
Math Ability 0.0048 0.0048∗∗ 0.0034 0.0070∗∗ 0.0028 0.0046 −0.0014
(0.0031) (0.0021) (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0024)
Mechanical Ability 0.0011 0.0013 0.0020 0.0006 0.0009 −0.0004 0.0024
(0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0018) (0.0017)
Mental Health 0.0002 −0.0004
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Pos. Expectations 0.0003 0.0012
(0.0011) (0.0012)
Criminal Index −0.0524∗∗ −0.0568∗∗
(0.0229) (0.0236)
Substance Abuse Index −0.0082 −0.0192
(0.0255) (0.0289)
HS Academic Creds −0.0000
(0.0000)
HS Vocational Creds 0.0001
(0.0003)
HS Academic Concentrator −0.0492
(0.0945)
HS Academic Specialist 0.1131
(0.1255)
HS Vocational Concentrator −0.0208
(0.0670)
HS Vocational Specialist 0.0492
(0.0661)
HS GPA −0.0696
(0.1283)
Constant 7.0422∗∗∗ 6.0013∗∗∗ 5.9275∗∗∗ 5.7338∗∗∗ 7.2270∗∗∗ 7.4282∗∗∗ 8.1843∗∗∗
(1.0050) (0.9323) (0.9456) (0.9793) (1.0914) (1.1301) (1.1770)
Location Controls X X X X X X X
Yearly FE X X X X X X X
Selection Correction X X X X X X X
Observations 32,642 30,573 30,573 30,573 25,539 22,656 25,029
Individuals 458 431 431 431 354 313 348
R2 0.176 0.178 0.172 0.180 0.187 0.227 0.193
1 Parameter estimates of selection corrected log earnings after mutually exclusive final schooling levels for respondents within the NLSY97 are
reported.
2 Standard errors in parentheses are not adjusted for the two-stage procedure, and should be interpreted cautiously.
3 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 10. Monthly Log Earnings within Non-CTE Programs with College Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Verbal Ability −0.0014 −0.0020 −0.0020 −0.0008 −0.0012
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Math Ability 0.0048 0.0039 0.0038 0.0040 0.0022
(0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0031)
Mechanical Ability 0.0011 0.0014 0.0015 0.0011 0.0013
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Year of 2Yr Coursework 0.0855∗∗ 0.0853∗∗ 0.0722∗∗
(0.0340) (0.0339) (0.0338)
Associate Degree Holder −0.0067 −0.0017 0.0441
(0.0657) (0.0659) (0.0616)
Transferred Into Program −0.0479
(0.0496)
Major FE X X
Location Controls X X X X X
Yearly FE X X X X X
Selection Correction X X X X X
Observations 32,642 32,642 32,642 32,642 32,642
Individuals 458 458 458 458 458
R2 0.176 0.195 0.196 0.256 0.278
1 Parameter estimates of selection corrected log earnings after mutually exclusive final schooling levels for respondents
within the NLSY97 are reported.
2 Standard errors in parentheses are not adjusted for the two-stage procedure, and should be interpreted cautiously.
3 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 11. Monthly Log Earnings within Non-STEM Programs - Additional Individual Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Verbal Ability −0.0008 0.0002 −0.0012 −0.0008 −0.0016 −0.0031∗∗ −0.0019
(0.0014) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
Math Ability 0.0043∗∗ 0.0028∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗ 0.0024 0.0033∗∗ 0.0027 0.0027∗∗
(0.0017) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0013)
Mechanical Ability −0.0003 −0.0015 0.0002 −0.0003 0.0002 0.0013 0.0004
(0.0012) (0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0012)
Mental Health 0.0014∗∗ 0.0013∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0006)
Pos. Expectations −0.0002 −0.0004
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Criminal Index −0.0517∗∗∗ −0.0430∗∗
(0.0190) (0.0198)
Substance Abuse Index 0.0450∗∗ 0.0472∗∗
(0.0193) (0.0191)
HS Academic Creds −0.0000∗
(0.0000)
HS Vocational Creds −0.0000
(0.0002)
HS Academic Concentrator −0.0268
(0.0507)
HS Academic Specialist −0.0400
(0.0628)
HS Vocational Concentrator 0.0489
(0.0408)
HS Vocational Specialist 0.0106
(0.0457)
HS GPA 0.0775
(0.0700)
Constant 3.0102∗∗∗ 2.8479∗∗∗ 2.7627∗∗∗ 2.9898∗∗∗ 3.2948∗∗∗ 3.6967∗∗∗ 3.2000∗∗∗
(0.7016) (0.6563) (0.6853) (0.6991) (0.7492) (0.7991) (0.8113)
Location Controls X X X X X X X
Yearly FE X X X X X X X
Selection Correction X X X X X X X
Observations 86,309 83,052 83,052 83,052 69,837 64,033 68,980
Individuals 1,437 1,385 1,385 1,385 1,143 1,047 1,128
R2 0.222 0.225 0.224 0.228 0.233 0.228 0.235
1 Parameter estimates of selection corrected log earnings after mutually exclusive final schooling levels for respondents within the NLSY97 are reported.
2 Standard errors in parentheses are not adjusted for the two-stage procedure, and should be interpreted cautiously.
3 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 12. Monthly Log Earnings within Non-STEM Programs with College Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Verbal Ability −0.0008 −0.0010 −0.0011 −0.0001 −0.0003
(0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0013)
Math Ability 0.0043∗∗ 0.0040∗∗ 0.0040∗∗ 0.0032∗ 0.0032∗
(0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Mechanical Ability −0.0003 −0.0001 −0.0000 −0.0001 −0.0000
(0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0011)
Year of 4Yr Coursework 0.0160 0.0157 0.0249
(0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0157)
Bachelor Degree Holder 0.1332∗∗∗ 0.1339∗∗∗ 0.1138∗∗
(0.0458) (0.0458) (0.0449)
Transferred Into Program −0.0112
(0.0241)
Major FE X X
Location Controls X X X X X
Yearly FE X X X X X
Selection Correction X X X X X
Observations 86,309 86,309 86,309 86,309 86,309
Individuals 1,437 1,437 1,437 1,437 1,437
R2 0.222 0.245 0.245 0.258 0.278
1 Parameter estimates of selection corrected log earnings after mutually exclusive final schooling levels for respondents
within the NLSY97 are reported.
2 Standard errors in parentheses are not adjusted for the two-stage procedure, and should be interpreted cautiously.
3 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 13. Monthly Log Earnings within STEM Programs - Additional Individual Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Verbal Ability 0.0053 0.0019 0.0033 0.0034 0.0068∗∗ 0.0087∗∗ 0.0030
(0.0035) (0.0028) (0.0025) (0.0028) (0.0031) (0.0043) (0.0038)
Math Ability 0.0028 0.0043 0.0023 0.0024 0.0032 0.0018 −0.0019
(0.0044) (0.0038) (0.0032) (0.0041) (0.0048) (0.0059) (0.0044)
Mechanical Ability −0.0049∗ −0.0016 −0.0033 −0.0033 −0.0053∗∗ −0.0085∗∗ −0.0035
(0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0038) (0.0032)
Mental Health −0.0017 −0.0017
(0.0013) (0.0013)
Pos. Expectations −0.0006 −0.0007
(0.0013) (0.0013)
Criminal Index −0.0317 −0.0331
(0.0459) (0.0451)
Substance Abuse Index 0.0065 0.0176
(0.0432) (0.0443)
HS Academic Creds −0.0000
(0.0001)
HS Vocational Creds −0.0007∗
(0.0004)
HS Academic Concentrator 0.0992
(0.1100)
HS Academic Specialist 0.0602
(0.1286)
HS Vocational Concentrator −0.1909∗
(0.0996)
HS Vocational Specialist 0.2320∗
(0.1253)
HS GPA 0.0286
(0.1577)
Constant 3.9797∗∗ 3.3008∗ 3.9904∗∗∗ 4.0667∗∗ 3.1160 3.8510∗ 4.8397∗∗
(1.8061) (1.7684) (1.4814) (1.7688) (1.8925) (2.2418) (2.3472)
Location Controls X X X X X X X
Yearly FE X X X X X X X
Selection Correction X X X X X X X
Observations 20,775 20,353 20,353 20,353 18,111 15,734 17,775
Individuals 353 345 345 345 302 266 299
R2 0.299 0.294 0.298 0.299 0.323 0.340 0.326
1 Parameter estimates of selection corrected log earnings after mutually exclusive final schooling levels for respondents within the NLSY97 are reported.
2 Standard errors in parentheses are not adjusted for the two-stage procedure, and should be interpreted cautiously.
3 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 14. Monthly Log Earnings within STEM Programs with College Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Verbal Ability 0.0053 0.0036 0.0047 0.0075∗∗ 0.0067∗∗
(0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0030) (0.0031)
Math Ability 0.0028 0.0029 0.0017 0.0013 0.0021
(0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0038) (0.0036)
Mechanical Ability −0.0049∗ −0.0032 −0.0043 −0.0044∗ −0.0040
(0.0029) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0026)
Year of 4Yr Coursework 0.0712∗∗ 0.0742∗∗ 0.0643∗
(0.0318) (0.0309) (0.0335)
Bachelor Degree Holder 0.0708 0.0473 0.0276
(0.1090) (0.1042) (0.1105)
Transferred Into Program −0.1398∗∗∗
(0.0449)
Major FE X X
Location Controls X X X X X
Yearly FE X X X X X
Selection Correction X X X X X
Observations 20,775 20,775 20,775 20,775 20,775
Individuals 353 353 353 353 353
R2 0.299 0.354 0.366 0.435 0.468
1 Parameter estimates of selection corrected log earnings after mutually exclusive final schooling levels for respondents
within the NLSY97 are reported.
2 Standard errors in parentheses are not adjusted for the two-stage procedure, and should be interpreted cautiously.
3 * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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